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Peer-to-Peer Law, Built on Bitcoin
Michael Abramowicz*

Abstract:
Bitcoin is a protocol promoted as the first peer-to-peer institution, an
alternative to a central bank. The decisions made through this protocol,
however, involve no judgment. Could a peer-to-peer protocol underpin
an institution that makes normative decisions? Indeed, an extension to
the Bitcoin protocol could allow a cryptocurrency to make law. Tacit
coordination games, in which players compete to identify consensus
issue resolutions, would determine currency ownership. For example,
an issue might be whether a cryptocurrency-based trust should disburse
funds to a putative beneficiary, and the game’s outcome would resolve
the question and result in gains or losses for coordination game
participants. A cryptocurrency can also be used to generate rules or
other written codes. Peer-to-peer law might be useful when official
decisionmakers are corrupt or when agency or transactions costs are
high. A modest starting point for cryptocurrency-based governance
would be as a replacement for Bitcoin’s centralized system for changing
its source code. A cryptocurrency incorporating tacit coordination
games could serve as a foundation for other projects requiring peer-topeer governance, ranging from arbitration to business associations,
which would enjoy inherent limited liability and would lack designated
management.

*
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Bitcoin, described by its promoters as “an innovative payment network and
a new kind of money,”1 has attracted extraordinary attention for a financial
innovation.2 This attention results less from the functions that Bitcoin serves,
operating as a digital medium of exchange and store of value,3 than from the
1

See BITCOIN, http://bitcoin.org (last visited Nov. 13, 2014).
See, e.g., Rob Wile, 10 Financial Innovations That Are Changing the World More than Bitcoin,
http://www.businessinsider.com/10-financial-innovations-more-exciting-than-bitcoin-2014-1 (last
visited Nov. 13, 2014) (identifying innovations in payment technology purportedly more important
than Bitcoin, despite receiving far less publicity).
3
Currencies are generally thought to fulfill these functions and a third, serving as a unit of account.
2
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decentralized nature of Bitcoin transactions. Unlike traditional currency and
financial instruments, Bitcoins are not issued by a central bank. Rather, anyone can
attempt to “mine” Bitcoins by using computers programmed to guess answers to a
computational puzzle.4 Bitcoin is thus neither a commodity currency (backed by
gold or some other commodity) nor a fiat currency (used by convention as a result
of a legal edict).5
Bitcoin’s independence from central authorities helps explain the
perception that it is a technological marvel. Bitcoin functions even though it is a
protocol without a referee. Of course, other protocols operate with minimal
supervision; the Internet does not require police officers to arrest those who violate
the rules of TCP/IP. But what makes Bitcoin remarkable is that it settles that most
controversial issue—who owns wealth—without need for a law enforcement
apparatus. Bitcoin can be seen not just as a currency, but more grandly as an
institution that creates and enforces property rights. It is an institution, however,
that can resolve only one type of decision – whether purported transfers of Bitcoins
will be validated and added to a list of approved transfers, known as the block
chain.6 If this is libertarian nirvana, it may seem to expose the limits of what peerto-peer transactions can accomplish. Governments necessarily make normative
decisions—legislative, executive, and judicial—and Bitcoin transactions involve
no judgment.
See, e.g., N. GREGORY MANKIW, MACROECONOMICS 22 (6th ed. 2007). Critics maintain that Bitcoin
has fulfilled the exchange and value store functions poorly and has not served the unit-of-account
function at all. See, e.g., David Yermack, Is Bitcoin a Real Currency? An Economic Appraisal (Apr.
1, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2361599 (last visited Sept. 11, 2014).
Its value is so volatile that few if any commercial parties would agree to denominate contracts in
Bitcoins. Cf. William J. Luther & Lawrence H. White, Can Bitcoin Become a Major Currency? 6
(George Mason Univ. Dept. of Econ. Working Paper No. 14-17), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2446604 (last visited Sept. 11, 2014) (arguing
that Bitcoin may succeed as a medium of exchange even if not as a unit of account, if it becomes
easy to trade in and out of Bitcoin, so that speculative risk can be decoupled from exchange use).
4
Mining, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Mining (last visited Sept. 11, 2014); see also infra
Part I.C.
5
The conventional wisdom of economists is that fiat currency is more stable than commodity
currency. See, e.g., Christopher Shea, Survey: No Support for Gold Standard Among Top
Economists, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2012. Skeptics (often called “goldbugs”) argue that commodity
currencies’ insulation from political decisionmaking makes them more stable. Some of these
skeptics believe that Bitcoin’s insulation from politics similarly may in the long term allow for
relative stability. See, e,g., DETLEV S. SCHLICHTER, PAPER MONEY COLLAPSE: THE FOLLY OF
ELASTIC MONEY 15-16, 289-300 (2d ed. 2014).
6
There is no central repository for this list. It is maintained separately by participating nodes. See
Block chain, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Block_chain (last visited Sept. 11, 2014). This
is what makes Bitcoin peer-to-peer.
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The most ambitious attempt to use cryptocurrencies as more general legal
tools reveal the apparent limits of those strategies. Bitcoin includes a rudimentary
scripting language7 that in principle permits a contract to be resolved by a thirdparty “oracle.” For example, a Bitcoin wiki suggests that a Bitcoin contract could
allow money to be transferred to a third-party only once the oracle gives
confirmation that a named individual has died.8 In effect, the oracle serves as an
escrow agent.9 Bitcoin is a weak substitute for conventional life insurance,
however, as insurance involves much more than escrow.10 The Ethereum project
could provide a closer substitute. It aims to create a cryptocurrency allowing
Turing-complete computations, i.e. classical computer programs of arbitrary
complexity.11 So, it might be possible to aggregate insurance premiums into a fund
and make payouts when specified conditions are met. But until computer programs
can pass the Turing test and exhibit general artificial intelligence, they will still lack
judgment. They will not, for example, be able to determine whether vague contract
provisions have been satisfied. Cryptocurrencies cannot solve the problem of
incomplete contracts,12 and as long as contracts are incomplete, humans will need
to resolve ambiguities.
This Article, however, shows that cryptocurrency protocols can be used to
aggregate human judgment and thus to make legal decisions. Just as a
cryptocurrency need not identify a central banker who maintains transaction
7

See Script, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Script (last visited Sept. 11, 2014).
Contracts—Example
4:
Using
external
state,
BITCOIN
WIKI,
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Contracts#Example_4:_Using_external_state (last visited Sept. 11, 2014)
If the oracle determines that a condition is met, it produces a digital signature needed to complete
the transaction.
9
The wiki also gives a separate example of an escrow transaction in which a client’s funds are
placed in escrow under terms such that the money can be sent to the merchant if both the client and
merchant agree (completing the purchase), to the client if both agree (refunding the amount, perhaps
because of a problem with delivery), or to the merchant (if the merchant and the mediator agree).
Contracts—Example
2:
Escrow
and
dispute
mediation,
BITCOIN
WIKI,
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Contracts#Example_2:_Escrow_and_dispute_mediation (last visited Sept.
11, 2014).
10
See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1986).
11
White Paper: A Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application Platform,
GITHUB, https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper (last visited Sept. 11, 2014).
12
Contracts are incomplete in part because some contingencies are not anticipated, but also because
parties leave them deliberately incomplete, either because the contracts are self-enforcing or because
people believe that norms of fairness will help resolve disputes. See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of
Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641 (2003). A cryptocurrency that can
exercise normative judgment can be seen as a mechanism that makes a contract self-enforcing or as
a mechanism that avoids judicial enforcement through peer-to-peer decisionmaking.
8
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records, so too would a cryptocurrency not need to identify specific people
responsible for making a decision. Cryptocurrencies, in other words, can
crowdsource decisionmaking.13 Crude mechanisms for crowdsourcing
decisionmaking already exist; consider, for example, Internet polls. A
cryptocurrency relying similarly on counting votes would be similarly unreliable.
The principle of “one person, one vote”14 cannot be implemented with any currency
that allows anonymous ownership. An alternative would be voting based on Bitcoin
interest.15 But such a system, or one allowing vote-buying,16 would give greater
influence to those with more Bitcoins.
A better approach is to design a system in which the cryptocurrency
protocol implements what game theorists call a “tacit coordination game.”17 In
Thomas Schelling’s famous tacit coordination game experiment, a subject must
plan to meet another subject in New York City the next day, but without advance
coordination of time and place.18 Schelling’s survey indicated that most would meet
at the Grand Central Terminal information booth at noon.19 A similar tacit
coordination game could give each participant the goal of answering a question in
the same way as later participants will answer the same question. Participants would
seek focal point solutions, much like the prospective rendez-vousers in New York.
The answer to the question posed is the most logical focal point. For example,
imagine asking someone on the street whether it is “cold” or “hot” outside, and
informing her that she will receive $10 if the next person to whom you ask the same
question (with the same deal) answers in the same way. Reporting her true
evaluation of the weather—or, better yet, what she expects would be the average
person’s evaluation of the average person’s evaluation of the weather—is a better
strategy than answering at random.

13

See generally JEFF HOWE, CROWDSOURCING: WHY THE POWER OF THE CROWD IS DRIVING THE
FUTURE OF BUSINESS (2009) (providing other examples of crowdsourcing by businesses).
14
See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (“The conception of political equality from the
Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and
Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.”).
15
See infra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing the use of such voting by the cryptocurrency
NXT).
16
See infra note 141-146 and accompanying text.
17
See, e.g., John Van Huyck et al., Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and
Coordination Failure, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 234 (1990).
18
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 55-56 (1980). Schelling coined the phrase
“tacit coordination game.” Id. at 54.
19
Id. at 56.
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The possibility that tacit coordination games could be used to address
normative questions has been recognized previously.20 But the prior literature has
imagined that some central authority has organized the tacit coordination game,
performing tasks such as compensating the winners.21 This poses a significant
barrier to using a tacit coordination game for legal purposes, even in enforcing a
voluntary contract. Even if contracting parties were to agree that their disputes
should be resolved by a tacit coordination game, the courts might refuse to enforce
such a contract. A tacit coordination game is not a recognized means of conducting
arbitration,22 and besides, it seems to be similar to gambling.23
With cryptocurrencies, using tacit coordination games to resolve contracts
becomes viable. A cryptocurrency protocol could implement the tacit coordination
game, so no central authority is needed to coordinate it. The protocol could establish
the gains and losses of players (functioning as judges of the questions before them),
and the result of the game could determine the ownership of cryptocurrency, for
example held in escrow. Ordinarily, the government can thwart certain types of
contracts by refusing to enforce those contracts,24 but cryptocurrency contracts can
be self-enforcing. The government might regulate payments into or out of the
cryptocurrency25 or regulate contracting parties directly. This is feasible, especially
because cryptocurrency contracts might need to be public so they can be judged,
but governments may hesitate to regulate parties entering into voluntary contracts.26
20

See Michael Abramowicz, Cyberadjudication, 86 IOWA L. REV. 533 (2001).
One commentator has proposed using a tacit coordination game for a particular purpose in Bitcoin,
but this proposal cannot be extended to more general normative questions. See infra note 169.
22
The Federal Arbitration Act generally requires agreements for mandatory arbitration to be
enforced. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Going
Private: Technology, Due Process, and Internet Dispute Resolution, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 151,
182 (2000). But an arbitration provision may not be enforced when “a waiver of judicial remedies
inherently conflicts with the underlying purposes of that other statute.” Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483 (1989). Some courts have thus refused to enforce
arbitration agreements where the agreement seemed unduly one-sided. See, e.g., Hooters v. Phillips,
173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999). A peer-to-peer arbitration provision might be voided if the courts are
uncomfortable with it.
23
See Abramowicz, supra note 20, at 541-56. Such a game might be considered to be a “game of
skill” and thus exempt from regulation. Cf. Steven D. Levitt et al., Is Texas Hold ‘Em a Game of
Chance? A Legal and Economic Analysis, 101 GEO. L.J. 581 (2013) (criticizing the courts’ approach
to distinguishing games of chance and skill).
24
See generally Note, A Law and Economics Look at Contracts Against Public Policy, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 1445 (2006) (assessing the justification for deterring contracts by refusing to enforce them).
25
The government attacks Internet gambling in much the same way. See Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5363 (2006).
26
In the Internet gambling context, for example, enforcement has been focused on the operators of
gaming companies, not individual gamblers, though this has partly been because of ambiguity as to
21
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This Article’s ambition is to describe the possibility of peer-to-peer law, not
to argue that it is desirable. Traditional legal institutions have obvious advantages.
Representative government is valuable both because political deliberation can
improve decisions27 and because democratic participation enhances legitimacy.28 A
full analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of existing institutions is well beyond
this Article’s scope, but peer-to-peer law is most plausible where existing
decisionmaking mechanisms are most flawed, for example where corruption is
endemic. Peer-to-peer decisionmakers have incentives to combat self-interested
decisionmaking. Similarly, peer-to-peer law could be helpful when agency costs
are especially high, as may be the case with some corporate decisionmaking, or if
decisionmakers are relatively uninformed, or should bureaucracy or litigation
impose unnecessary transaction costs on relatively simple decisions. Peer-to-peer
decisionmaking could emerge in niche legal contexts. This could provide data and
experience about the relative advantages and disadvantages of such decisionmaking
relative to more conventional decisionmaking.
Peer-to-peer law is most plausible as a mechanism of voluntary private
ordering. The strongest defense against the argument that Bitcoin is inherently
worthless29 is that there exists (or in the future may exist30) demand for peer-to-peer
transactions. Each element of this defense also suggests demand for peer-to-peer
decisionmaking. First, government regulation might impose transactions costs, and
a cryptocurrency may be able to evade such regulation.31 Similarly, peer-to-peer
whether individuals commit illegal acts by gambling online. See Jason A. Miller, Don’t Bet on This
Legislation, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 185, 211-12 (2008).
27
See, e.g., Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLITY:
NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STATE 17 (Alan Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds., 1989) (discussing how
ideal deliberation can enhance legitimacy). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why
Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71 (2000) (documenting that deliberation can sometimes
promote polarization).
28
See, e.g., James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free
Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 505-06 (2011) (discussing the significance of the norm of
political participation).
29
See Alex Crippen, Buffett Blasts Bitcoin as ‘Mirage’, CNBC, Mar. 14, 2014 (video), available at
http://www.cnbc.com/id/101494937) (reporting Warren Buffett’s skepticism).
30
Anticipated future value is what makes Bitcoin valuable today. See, e.g., Timothy B. Lee, Why
I’m Investing in Bitcoins (Updated), VOX, (Sept. 5, 2014), available at
http://www.vox.com/2014/9/5/6086171/why-im-investing-in-bitcoins (estimating Bitcoin’s value
based on the anticipated number of transactions in the future). The uncertainty about future value,
however, contributes to Bitcoin’s volatility. See, e.g., Jon Southurst, Bitcoin Price Continues to Fall,
Breaks $200 Mark, COINDESK (Jan. 14, 2015), available at http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-pricecontinues-fall-breaks-200-mark/ (noting that Bitcoin had lost over 80% of its value in a year).
31
Cryptocurrency proponents argue that Bitcoin might thus someday serve as an effective system
of
micropayments.
See
Campbell
R.
Harvey,
Cryptofinance
(2014),
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decisionmaking might reduce litigation costs. Second, some people may have an
ideological preference, based on some form of libertarianism, anti-corporatism, or
anarchism, for using Bitcoin.32 If someday it is just as easy to enter into transactions
with Bitcoin as with MasterCard,33 then this preference can be cheaply indulged, as
could a preference for nongovernmental decisionmaking. Third, a cryptocurrency
could provide privacy protections, which both law-abiding citizens and criminals
may have reasons to value privacy.34 Currently, Bitcoin transactions can sometimes
be traced,35 though proposed changes to Bitcoin36 and alternative cryptocurrencies37
provide much stronger privacy protection.
The typical defense of a decision’s legitimacy identifies the decision as an
output of some recognized governmental or even private body, but some may
perceive legitimacy to derive from an absence of individual control. As long as the
output is recognizable, this can be seen as consistent with legal positivism.38 Even
social customs can serve as an authoritative source of law, at least under many
versions of positivism.39 But the possibility of peer-to-peer decisionmaking
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2438299; see also Daniel Cawrey, The Promise of Bitcoin Micropayments:
Corporations, Incentives and Altcoins, COINDESK (Feb. 11, 2014), available at
http://www.coindesk.com/promise-bitcoin-micropayments-corporations-incentives-altcoins/ (last
visited Sept. 11, 2014).
32
See Alan Feuer, The Bitcoin Ideology, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2013, at SR12.
33
See Bitcoin’s Four Hurdles: Part One—Usability, June 4, 2011.
34
See Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745 (2007).
35
See Tom Simonite, Mapping the Bitcoin Economy Could Reveal Users’ Identities, MIT TECH.
REV. (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/518816/mapping-the-bitcoineconomy-could-reveal-users-identities/.
36
See, e.g., Tim Ruffing et al., CoinShuffle: Practical Decentralized Coin Mixing for Bitcoin,
https://www.petsymposium.org/2014/papers/Ruffing.pdf (last viewed Sept. 11, 2014).
37
See, e.g., Darkcoin, DARKCOIN WIKI http://wiki.darkcoin.eu/wiki/Main_Page (last visited Nov.
9, 2014) (providing an overview of a cryptocurrency called DarkCoin, relying on a technology
called DarkSend that prevents transactions from appearing in a public block chain).
38
For a useful summary of positivism and its variants, see Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism,
Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1140-44 (1999) (reviewing ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL POSITISM
IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1998)). Positivist theory indicates that law’s content is a social fact.
Id. at 1141. Ordinarily, the relevant social fact might be whether a particular institution (such as the
legislature) has made a particular decision, but the occurrence of a peer-to-peer decision also could
be social fact.
39
Whether this is in tension with positivism, however, depends on the particular version of
positivism. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Custom in American Property Law: A Vanishing Act, 48 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 507, 519 (2013) (noting that “there is no reason in many versions of positivism why
custom could not be a source of law,” though “narrow Austinian-style positivism that identifies law
with commands of a sovereign does not naturally look at custom as a source of the law”).

PEER-TO-PEER GOVERNANCE

9

challenges the conventional assumption that centralized institutions (such as
legislatures and courts) are needed to produce law of sufficient clarity to be
workable. Justice Holmes insisted that “[t]he common law is not a brooding
omnipresence in the sky, but the articular voice of some sovereign or quasi
sovereign that can be identified.”40 This Article, however, suggests that law can be
produced by non-sovereigns competing to discern the brooding omnipresence of
the best answers to normative legal questions.
The dawn of cryptocurrency-based law is not near. There are serious
obstacles to its emergence, including the need for experimentation with tacit
coordination games to establish that participants will seek to address the normative
questions posed.41 There is, however, a natural test case for cryptocurrency-based
tacit coordination games. They could be used to make (or merely recommend)
decisions necessary for effective operation of Bitcoin or another cryptocurrency.
The Bitcoin protocol, ironically, is coordinated in the same centralized manner as
other open source projects.42 A few people decide whether to accept pull requests
on the source code.43 It is sometimes said that Bitcoin is decentralized because
anyone can fork44 the Bitcoin code and create a new cryptocurrency.45 But this is a
bit like saying that colonial governments were not centralized because anyone could
move to the wilderness and form their own governments. Open source is not
inherently peer-to-peer. A cryptocurrency is a natural testing ground for peer-topeer decisionmaking because the existence of centralized decisionmaking is at odds
with the broader goals of the alternative currency movement.
Peer-to-peer decisionmaking could be used to determine whether to make
changes to the Bitcoin reference code. This modest application of peer-to-peer law
would allow the institution of Bitcoin to respond to the challenges it faces. An
existential risk to Bitcoin is that some other cryptocurrency could emerge as
40

S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
See infra Part II.A.2.
42
For a critique of Bitcoin as insufficiently decentralized, see Arthur Gervais et al., Is Bitcoin a
Decentralized Currency? (2013), available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/829.pdf (last visited Sept.
11, 2014).
43
See Alec Liu, Who’s Building Bitcoin? An Inside Look at Bitcoin’s Open Source Development,
VICE http://motherboard.vice.com/en_au/blog/whos-building-bitcoin-an-inside-look-at-bitcoinsopen-source-development (describing the development process and naming the developers with
“push rights”).
44
For a description of forking and an argument that the possibility of forking constrains those
supervising open-source projects to take into account community views, see Linus Nyman & Juho
Lindman, Code Forking, Governance, and Sustainability in Open Source Software, TECH.
INNOVATION MGMT. REV., Jan. 2013, at 7.
45
See How to Fork Bitcoin and Build Own Cryptocurrency, STACKEXCHANGE
http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/19287/how-to-fork-bitcoin-and-build-owncryptocurrency (last visited Sept. 11, 2014).
41
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dominant, and inclusion of peer-to-peer decisionmaking could bolster either
Bitcoin or a competitor. Peer-to-peer decisionmaking also could be useful in
conducting other currency-related activities. For example, it could be used to
resolve any disputes about whether blocks of transactions should be added to the
block chain. This is the central task performed by Bitcoin miners, and development
of a reliable alternative system could save resources. These resources in turn might
be used to reward activities that promote the currency, such as provision of liquidity
to stabilize the currency, lobbying, developing source code, or suggesting useful
improvements to the cryptocurrency). Peer-to-peer decisionmaking could be used
to decide whether to reward those engaging in such activities with newly minted
currency.
Part I of this Article will introduce the concept of peer-to-peer governance
by identifying its three critical components: a decentralized ledger, a decentralized
decision, and a decentralized fisc. Bitcoin has each of these, but its capacity to make
decentralized decisions is limited, and its fiscal power is restricted to supporting
mining activity. Part II explains how formal tacit coordination games can be played
using transactions on the Bitcoin block chain and how the results of such games
could transform Bitcoin into a genuine peer-to-peer institution, with a much more
flexible decisionmaking apparatus. Finally, Part III examines the potential role for
peer-to-peer decisionmaking in the legal system, focusing on private law (including
voluntary arbitration and trusts), but also considering the possibility of public law
institutions built on Bitcoin, most plausibly a central bank.
I.

THE THREE CORNERSTONES OF PEER-TO-PEER GOVERNANCE

The Oxford English Dictionary defines “peer-to-peer” as “designating or
relating to a network in which each computer can act as a server for the others,
allowing shared access to files and other resources.”46 The most familiar context,
technological and legal, is peer-to-peer filesharing,47 where the absence of a central
server eliminates the need for intermediaries to store files being shared and
frustrates the ability of the government to stop copyright violations.48 Peer-to-peer
governance, then, might be defined as a system of decisionmaking generally
46

Peer-to-peer
definition,
OED.COM,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/139725?redirectedFrom=peer-to-peer#eid31476999 (last visited
Nov. 20, 2014).
47
See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (allowing suit against
companies that created peer-to-peer software for inducing copyright infringement).
48
See generally Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 726-45 (2003) (explaining the
development of peer-to-peer filesharing as a mechanism of interest group behavior designed to
minimize legal costs).
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regarded as authoritative even though it lacks a centrally designated authority or
authorities to make and enforce decisions. The United States includes centrally
designated authorities (the legislature, the executive, and the judicial branch), so it
is not peer-to-peer governance. A state of anarchy, moreover, is not peer-to-peer
governance, because while it may lack centrally designated authorities, it does not
produce authoritative rules or adjudications.49 Perhaps there are boundary cases,
such as social norms and practices that function like legal institutions.50 But Lisa
Bernstein’s diamond merchants have formalized systems of arbitration,51 and Bob
Ellickson’s ranchers rely substantially on unwritten rules rather than on an
alternative system of creating legislation.52 For rules and adjudications to be
authoritative, they generally must be in writing,53 and familiar institutions either
have centralized processes for lawmaking or function without relying on
authoritative written law.
There are thus only limited precedents for peer-to-peer governance before
Bitcoin, which engages in peer-to-peer governance of a limited sort. The Bitcoin
protocol does produce written decisions—recording transfers of property rights and
granting new property rights to Bitcoin miners who successfully solve hash
problems—without designating any central authority to produce or even to store
the decisions. But Bitcoin is a rather feeble system of peer-to-peer governance,
because Bitcoin cannot produce open-ended rules (whether written in natural or
computer language). Bitcoin does require important multidimensional decisions
about how the protocol should evolve, and humans make those decisions based on
arguments and written discussion,54 but these decisions are made by a centralized
49

Anarchism, however, does not necessarily entail the rejection of all authority. See generally PAUL
MCLAUGHLIN, ANARCHISM AND AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL
ANARCHISM (2007).
50
Norms can have large effects on behavior, but because they are contestable and can change. For
an account of changes in social norms, see Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and
Regulation of Norms, 96 U. MICH. L. REV. 338, 391-400 (1997).
51
Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Constractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 124-30 (1992) (describing a highly developed system of
arbitration that serves as an alternative to legal enforcement).
52
Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986). The ranchers do recognize the existence of central authorities,
and will occasionally complain to their elected bounty supervisors. See id. at 680.
53
Jed Rubenfeld argues that writenness is central to the case for judicial supremacy. See JED
RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 163-68
(2001).
54
See, e.g., BIP Proposal: Eliminate No-Fee Transactions in Bitcoin, BITCOIN TALK (Sept. 15,
2014), https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=150194.0 (providing discussion of a Bitcoin
Improvement Proposal).
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group with power to modify a particular version of the Bitcoin software code
repository generally regarded as authoritative.55 The Bitcoin source code is created
as an open source project, but any particular fork of an open-source project has a
central repository and is thus not itself peer-to-peer. Bitcoin, in short, has peer-topeer governance for approving transactions, but not for approving changes to
Bitcoin.
This Part describes the essential components of a robust system of peer-topeer governance, capable of generating rules in natural or computer language and
of providing incentives to reward those who enforce those rules or otherwise
advance the interests of the institution. The three essential components are a
decentralized ledger for recording decisions, a decentralized means of making
decisions, and a decentralized fiscal power. It argues that these form a three-legged
stool, with each benefiting from a robust version of the other two. A decentralized
ledger can’t work and is of little use without decentralized decisionmaking (at least
as to whether a purported ledger is valid) and spending. A decentralized tool for
making decisions is but philosophy if those decisions cannot be recorded in an
authoritative way outside anyone’s control or if there is no means of enforcing those
decisions with financial incentives. And the ability to spend money cannot be
exercised if there is no means to decide how to spend it or to record such decisions.
A cryptocurrency is but one example of a possible peer-to-peer institution,
but it is a critical example, because it enables the decentralized fiscal power, and so
this Part will elaborate on the three essential components by focusing on
cryptocurrencies. Bitcoin has a decentralized ledger (though only for transactions),
decentralized decisionmaking (though only for a very particular type of decision),
and a decentralized fiscal power (but only to reward a specific type of activity). But
its advances point the way to the possibility of a true peer-to-peer governance
institution, built on extensions to the Bitcoin protocol or to similar cryptocurrency
protocols and capable of performing tasks more complex than keeping track of
currency transactions. The core extension needed is the facility to play tacit
coordination games based on normative questions.
It may seem odd to imagine building a cryptocurrency on a tacit
coordination game, but in fact each of Bitcoin’s components already depends on
tacit coordination. As a recent economic analysis of Bitcoin notes, “Participants
must maintain consensus (1) on the rules to determine validity of transactions, (2)
on which transactions have occurred in the system, and (3) that the currency has
value.”56 These three challenges correspond to the three powers to be discussed
55

See Bitcoin, GITHUB https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin (last visited Nov. 9, 2014) (providing
official Bitcoin source code).
56
Joshua A. Kroll et al., The Economics of Bitcoin Mining or, Bitcoin in the Presence of Adversaries
2
(2013),
available
at
http://www.weis2013.econinfosec.org/papers/KrollDaveyFeltenWEIS2013.pdf.
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here. Bitcoin’s decentralized ledger requires consensus on the rules for whether a
transaction is valid; Bitcoin’s decentralized decision involves tacit coordination
about which collection of individually valid transactions is the complete and
authoritative one; and Bitcoin can exercise its decentralized fiscal power to reward
miners only because there is a consensus that cryptocurrencies in general and
Bitcoin in particular are valuable. This section describes these forms of tacit
coordination, illustrating the tale of how Bitcoin works from a new perspective.
A. The Decentralized Ledger
Some have argued that the writtenness of the Constitution mandates
particular forms of interpretation or judicial review.57 Even critics of that claim
acknowledge that writing serves important legal functions.58 Among those is that
“the text serves as a focal point for legal coordination.”59 Absent land records, for
example, it would be difficult to coordinate concerning use of land. Similarly,
although statutes and judicial decisions could exist without recording, the written
record reduces the risk of distortion of legislative intent or judicial doctrine. With
land, expensive title searches are needed to verify the extent of rights,60 and the risk
of fraud requires insurance.61 It is possible, however, to ascertain the literal content
of most legal decisions cheaply and with near certainty. Disputes concern their
implications and meaning.
The central technological advance of Bitcoin is the invention of the block
chain, which tracks decisions of owners of Bitcoins. A typical decision is a transfer
of Bitcoins from one user (identified by a Bitcoin address) to another user (similarly
identified),62 though more complicated transactions are possible.63 The block chain
57

See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 635 (1999)
(“[A] proper respect for the writtenness of the text means that those committed to this Constitution
have no choice but to respect the original meaning of its text until it is formally amended in
writing.”).
58
Andrew B. Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 1025, 1047-70 (2010).
59
Id. at 1048.
60
Ordinarily, it is optimal not to search too far in the past, even though this means that title will not
be established with certainty. See Matthew Baker et al., Optimal Title Search, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
139 (2002).
61
See, e.g., David E. Woolley & Lisa D. Herzog, MERS: The Unreported Effects of Lost Chain of
Title on Real Property Owners, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 365, 398-99 (2012) (noting that title insurance
covers fraud concerning the chain of title).
62
A Bitcoin address is generally a randomly generated string of characters. See Address, BITCOIN
WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Address (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
63
See, e.g., supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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includes only transactions that are verified as legitimate. One can ascertain a
prospective transaction’s legitimacy as of the most recent block chain update by
examining the block chain to determine the number of Bitcoins associated with the
originating address. Though designed specifically for currency transactions, the
block chain is a tool of general applicability, and at least one alternative currency
is designed with the purpose of enabling metadata to be stored in transactions in its
block chain.64 Thus in principle, a block chain can be an authoritative,
chronologically ordered record of any type of legal decision.
Any database can store records chronologically. What differentiates the
block chain is that it is a database with no central repository. Any number of copies
of the block chain may exist, and the Bitcoin protocol is designed to ensure that
they are in sync, or more precisely that they are eventually consistent65 in that
temporary deviations are resolved over time. This should work even if
noncooperative individuals seek to falsify the block chain to their own advantage,
for example to allow them to spend their Bitcoins twice or more. The block chain
may function even if some subset of the servers fail, for example because of natural
disaster or governmental interference. Thus, if an authoritative written record of all
decisions is a prerequisite for effective governance, the block chain is a mechanism
that satisfies this requirement peer-to-peer.
The most significant prior art underlying the block chain is public key
cryptography. A mathematical technique can be used to quickly generate two keys
of a specific length (say, 256 bits). One of the keys can used to scramble a
communication, and the other key can then unscramble it.66 This can be used to
authenticate documents. A hash function can create a short code from a document,
essentially a fingerprint.67 The authenticator then scrambles (encrypts) this code
using the private key. The public key can be used to decrypt it, producing the
original hash. Thus, anyone who knows the relevant algorithms and the public key
can determine, with extremely high confidence, that someone who knew the private
key corresponding to the public key must have performed the encryption. The only
way to determine the private key from the public key is to guess, and this would
take eons.68 The production of the encrypted code is taken to signify agreement with
64

See FLORINCOIN, http://florincoin.org/florincoin.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
See generally Werner Vogels, Eventually Consistent, 52 COMMUNICATIONS OF ACM 40 (2009),
available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=1435417.1435432 (last visited Sept. 15, 2014)
(explaining eventually consistency in database design).
66
See generally UNDERSTANDING CRYPTOGRAPHY: A TEXTBOOK FOR STUDENTS AND
PRACTITIONERS 149-73 (2011) (providing an overview of symmetric key cryptography).
67
See, e.g., Ralph C. Losey, HASH: The New Bates Stamp, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 12-16 (2007)
(providing an accessible introduction to hashing).
68
Id. at 156-57 (discussing the relationship of key lengths to the difficulty of guessing keys). With
65
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the content of the document. A Bitcoin address is a public key, and a transaction
must be signed with the private key corresponding to that public key.
A computer can verify a digital signature quickly,69 and this simplifies
construction of the block chain. It is trivial to confirm the legitimacy of all
transactions that led to particular Bitcoins being owned by the person purporting to
transfer them. No one could create a block chain with fake transfers or unauthorized
transactions, because any collection of transactions can be easily verified. That is,
anyone can easily confirm that a holder of a private key corresponding to the public
key that sent the Bitcoins approved the transaction. The challenge that the block
chain overcomes is different—the danger that an authorized transaction will be
omitted from the block chain. If one could spend Bitcoins but keep this transaction
off the block chain, then one might be able to spend those Bitcoins again.70
Bitcoin addresses the problem in part by adding transactions in ordered
groups, called blocks. Bitcoin provides incentives, to be discussed in the next
section, for miners to periodically create these blocks, but it makes this difficult to
do, sufficiently difficult that a new block will be created on average only every 10
minutes.71 The blocks are linked by hashes. When a block is added, a hash function
produces a hash based on fields including the previous block’s hash and the
transactions on the new block. Thus, it is not possible to omit a block or a
transaction on a block without changing the hash on all subsequent blocks. Thus, if
one knows of a particular previous legitimate transaction and the hash of its block,72
one can verify the legitimacy of all transactions reported on the block chain up to
that block. It is not possible with a reasonable amount of computer time to create a
series of fake transactions that will result in a hash that exactly matches the real
hash.73 If the blocks in the block chain are not properly linked, then the client
software will recognize the block chain as fake. Each client will reject such a block
a 256-bit key, there are 2256 combinations, more than a 1 followed by 77 zeros.
69
For example, one public key signature system can verify 71,000 signatures per second on an
ordinary quad-core processor. See Ed25519: High-Speed High-Security Signatures (last visited
Sept. 15, 2014).
70
A recipient of payments might defend against this by waiting to perform its side of the contract
(such as transferring goods) until the new payment was confirmed on the block chain, preferably
some blocks before the most recent one. See infra note 79 and accompanying text (noting the
possibility that the synchronization process might lead to the removal of some blocks from the block
chain).
71
This time period was selected apparently arbitrarily in the original Bitcoin paper. See Satoshi
Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System 4 (2008), available at
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
72
Client software tracks some previous transactions, designated as “checkpoints.” See infra note 80
and accompanying text.
73
See, e.g., Losey, supra note 67, at 17-18 (discussing the irreversibility of hash functions).
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chain because those programming and hosting client software know that others will
reject such a block chain as fake.
This provides a preliminary illustration of tacit coordination’s centrality to
Bitcoin. Anyone could fork the block chain and make a client with some other set
of rules, for example deleting some previously accepted transactions because the
Bitcoins were reported stolen.74 If this fork were widely accepted, then the Bitcoin
protocol could change to include this ad hoc list of exceptions to the general
principles. This seems highly unlikely, however, because even if there is a strong
normative argument for this change, there is also a strong argument, grounded in
the need to protect Bitcoin’s stability, against ad hoc exceptions. When, however,
the authoritative Bitcoin software repository changes the rules of Bitcoin, as it often
does,75 these changes have been widely accepted, at least so far. Revolution always
remains possible, however, and for sufficiently strong reasons, the tacit
coordination game could someday lead to many or all Bitcoin users accepting some
other set of rules, even rules other than those respected by the software in the
generally recognized official repository.
B. The Decentralized Decision
The mechanism as described so far does not address the risk that two miners
will simultaneously add different blocks, some containing one transaction and some
containing another. This won’t happen often because of design decisions to be
covered in the next section that make it difficult to create a valid block, but it is
always possible. Bitcoin needs a system for determining which is the authoritative
block chain. It resolves this with a coordination rule. The valid block chain is
considered to be the block chain that required the most work to form,76 which will
generally be the longest block chain.77 So, once another miner adds a block to one
of the block chains, that becomes the longest, and anyone aware of this block
74

For example, the Bitcoin protocol could have been changed to nullify a large theft. Cf. Timothy
B. Lee, Hackers Allegedly Stole $400 Million in Bitcoins. Here’s How to Catch Them, WASHINGTON
POST
BLOG
(Feb.
28,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/theswitch/wp/2014/02/28/hackers-allegedly-stole-400-million-in-bitcoins-heres-how-to-catch-them/.
75
See Releases, GITHUB https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/releases (last visited Nov. 20, 2014)
(providing a list of Bitcoin software releases).
76
See http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/936/how-does-a-client-decide-which-is-thelongest-block-chain-if-there-is-a-fork (explaining that block chains are compared based on their
score target).
77
The longest block chain might not be the authoritative one if someone sought to create a new
block chain from scratch. One could easily falsify a block chain containing a large number of blocks,
but it would be clear that the level of difficulty of adding a block to this block chain was low, and it
would be rejected in favor of the authentic block chain.
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chain’s existence will ignore the other block chain. Of course, blocks could be
simultaneously added again, but the coordination rule and the difficulty of adding
blocks according to a set schedule ensures that eventually, one block chain will
emerge as the consensus longest one. The coordination rule is akin to the intuition
that the time to meet someone in New York without communication is noon. One
can imagine an infinite number of functions that would determine which is the
better block chain, but the longest block chain rule stands out as particularly salient.
Bitcoin’s approach to this issue means that decisionmaking is not
instantaneous. It could not be. Public key cryptography can provide near instant
verification that the owner of Bitcoins (or, more precisely, a holder of the private
key associated with the public key address) has authorized their transfer or a
particular script that ultimately may lead to their transfer,78 but the possibility that
someone might make two such transfers simultaneously means that instant
confirmation is impossible. A merchant who wishes to confirm that a transaction
with Bitcoin is valid must not only wait for the transaction to be added to the block
chain, but indeed wait long enough to ensure that this block chain remains the
authoritative one. In theory, even after several blocks have been added, it is possible
that some longer block chain could emerge, but empirically, this is highly
unlikely,79 especially if no competing block chain has yet emerged.
The fear that an inconsistent block chain might emerge at some later time,
along with a desire to facilitate quick rejection of long block chains that required
only small amounts of effort to create,80 has led to the addition of another
mechanism for identifying the valid block chain: checkpointing. 81 A checkpoint is
a record of the block chain hash as of a certain point in time, and the Bitcoin
reference software itself records checkpoints that must be included in the block
chain for it to be valid.82 Thus, if the new software is generally accepted, then it is
78

See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing Bitcoin scripts).
The largest number of blocks that were added to a version of the block chain before being
orphaned as a result of a longer chain emerging is four blocks, as of this writing. See What is the
longest blockchain fork that has been orphaned to date, STACKEXCHANGE
http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/3343/what-is-the-longest-blockchain-fork-that-hasbeen-orphaned-to-date (last visited Nov. 20, 2014). Presumably, however, the vast majority or all
transactions in the orphaned blocks were still ultimately incorporated in the block chain.
80
Checkpointing is motivated by a need to combat denial-of-service attacks, in which attackers
present artificially constructed block chains that are longer than the authentic block chain but
required less effort to create. See What Are Checkpoints in Bitcoin Code?, BITCOIN TALK,
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=194078.35;wap2 (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
81
For a discussion of checkpointing, including complaints by some that it is inconsistent with peerto-peer decisionmaking, see https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=194078.0.
82
See,
e.g.,
Add
a
new
checkpoint
at
block
295,000,
GITHUB,
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/4541/commits (last visited Nov. 20, 2014) (adding a new
79
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impossible for any transactions older than the checkpoint to be reversed.
Checkpointing represents a deviation from a pure peer-to-peer system, because the
checkpoint is the result of a decision by the authoritative Bitcoin software designers
that it is wise, all things considered, to add this safety device. These decisions may
themselves result from a type of focal point coordination—general agreement in
the community that a checkpoint should be added—but it is still a centralized
decision. One commentator has argued that checkpointing is essential as a practical
matter, but that decentralized currencies are therefore impossible.83
Checkpointing can be seen as a reflection of the limits of the Bitcoin
decision mechanism. The mechanism can be used to make only one type of
decision, and the developers of Bitcoin do not trust the protocol entirely even to
make that decision without the help of another mechanism that is the direct product
of human judgment. Those human judgments are thus hard-coded into the protocol
itself. There is nothing inherently wrong with adding a small centralized component
to a peer-to-peer protocol, just as there is nothing inherently wrong with running
any non-peer-to-peer web service. But it shows that even in Bitcoin, there is a
perception that centralized dictates can be useful to ensure continued successful
coordination and will be broadly accepted by the relevant community. If Bitcoin
had a system for aggregating human judgment, it might still include checkpointing,
because checkpointing makes it easier to identify a valid version of the block chain,
but the decisions to add checkpoints might be made peer-to-peer instead of as a
result of a centralized software update.
C. The Decentralized Fisc
The most celebrated and controversial aspect of the Bitcoin protocol is the
incentive that Bitcoin uses to ensure that blocks are generated at regular intervals.
The incentive is financial. Bitcoin provides a reward for generating a block of
transactions to add to the end of the block chain. The “miner” who generates a block
receives some quantity of Bitcoin, though not from any other individual. Mining
creates new Bitcoins that the protocol recognizes as valid. The size of the reward is
fixed according to a schedule, with the number of new Bitcoins decreasing
approximately 50% every four years.84 A miner also can receive any transaction
fees from transferors of Bitcoins who voluntarily include these fees in their
transactions to encourage miners to include their transactions.85 Thus, the miners
checkpoint).
83
See Ben Laurie, Decentralised Currencies Are Probably Impossible: But Let’s At Least Make
Them Efficient (July 5, 2011), available at http://www.links.org/files/decentralised-currencies.pdf.
84
See https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Controlled_supply (illustrating the schedule)
85
Transaction fees, Bitcoin Wiki, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Transaction_fees (last visited Nov. 20,
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are engaged in an activity (adding blocks) that is socially useful to the Bitcoin
community, and Bitcoin incentivizes miners to engage in this activity by granting
new Bitcoins. Because Bitcoins are valuable, the Bitcoin protocol is able to provide
financial incentives in a peer-to-peer way.
This would be straightforward if confirming transactions were an inherently
expensive activity. If, for example, it took a great deal of computer power to arrange
transactions in a block, confirm their digital signatures, and calculate a new hash
value, then the reward for the Bitcoin miners could be explained by the difficulty
of their task. In fact, however, this is trivial. The danger is not that too few miners
would confirm transactions and add them to the block chain but that too many
would and that some might intentionally omit transactions. So, the Bitcoin protocol
makes it artificially difficult to mine blocks. A block can be added to the block
chain only if the block’s hash results in a number lower than a specified target.86
Under the Bitcoin protocol, this target will fluctuate depending on the success of
miners so that on average a block is added once every 10 minutes.87 If over time
more miners enter Bitcoin and computer hardware improves,88 the target falls.
Bitcoin miners are thus engaging in an activity that is useful to the Bitcoin
community, but only an infinitesimal portion of the computing power is used to
generate digital signatures. As of this writing, the target is so low that it begins with
16 zeros.89 A miner hoping to win Bitcoins collects some set of transactions and
fills out the fields of the block record, including a field containing the hash value
of the previous block and a field containing a nonce.90 The nonce can be any 32-bit

2014). A small transaction fee is required for very small transfers of Bitcoins; this mechanisms is
designed to discourage Bitcoin “dust” or “spam” from filling the block chain. See BITCOIN FEES,
http://bitcoinfees.com/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2014). Most clients will also ordinarily not include in
a block larger transactions that do not include some transaction fees, though if a block does include
such transactions, other clients will consider it to be a legitimate part of the block chain.
86
For the current target, in hexadecimal form, see Hextarget, BLOCK EXPLORER,
http://blockexplorer.com/q/hextarget (last visited Nov. 20, 2014).
87
See supra note 71.
88
Bitcoin miners today generally use specialized hardware that can calculate hashes much more
quickly than general purpose computers. See, e.g., Tom Simonite, Custom Chips Could Be the
Shovels
in
a
Bitcoin
Gold
Rush,
MIT TECH. REV.
(Dec.
5,
2012)
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/508061/custom-chips-could-be-the-shovels-in-a-bitcoingold-rush/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
89
The
value
as
of
this
writing
is
00000000000000003AAEA2000000000000000000000000000000000000000000.
Thus,
the
probability of any single hash being successful is less than 1 in 16 16, or approximately 1.8 * 1019
(i.e., 18 billion billion).
90
See Cryptographic Nonce, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_nonce (defining a
“nonce” as “an arbitrary number used only once in a cryptographic communication”).
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value of a certain size, and so the miner’s strategy is to try many nonce values,
calculating the block hash for each one, hoping to produce a hash less than the
target. A miner must decide what transactions to include before attempting a hash,
but the miner has an affirmative reason to include all transactions with positive
transaction fees, and no reason to exclude transactions.91 Sometimes, miners
include even transactions without transaction fees, perhaps because this contributes
to the general welfare of Bitcoin from which they benefit.92
Bitcoin mining thus may largely be characterized as rent-seeking,93 and just
as the expected investments of ships searching for buried treasure will generally
average about the value of the treasure,94 in equilibrium one should expect the cost
of mining to equal the number of Bitcoins that miners receive. Rent-seeking can be
socially wasteful, but it is not inherently. Patent theorists, for example, recognize
that races to invent dissipate rents and that the challenge of patent policy is to ensure
that the process of rent dissipation produces as much social benefit as possible, for
example by incentivizing early invention.95 Bitcoin’s rent dissipation uses large
amounts of energy, imposing negative environmental externalities.96 A partial
solution would be for miners to solve problems that require large amounts of
memory instead of fast computation.97 One proposed variant creates problems
91

It might seem that a block with more transactions would slow down hashing, but in fact the hash
is of a fixed-size header to eliminate this incentive to drop transactions. See Weakness—Dropping
transactions, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Weaknesses#Dropping_transactions (last
visited Sept. 15, 2014).
92
What is the incentive for Bitcoin miners to add transactions without fees to a block?, QUORA,
http://www.quora.com/What-is-the-incentive-for-Bitcoin-miners-to-add-transactions-without-feesto-a-block (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
93
The legal literature typically focuses on rent seeking through the political process. See, e.g., CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 70 (1990).
But it is often defined considerably more broadly. See GORDON TULLOCK ET AL., GOVERNMENT
FAILURE 43 (2002) (offering the following definition: “the use of resources for the purpose of
obtaining rents for people where the rents themselves come from some activity that has some
negative social value”); Kevin M. Murphy et al., Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?, 83
AM. ECON. REV. 409, 409 (1993) (encompassing within the definition “any distributive activity that
takes up resources”).
94
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 41 (5th ed. 1998) (explaining how
rent seeking can lead to complete dissipation of rent).
95
See John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 458-75
(2014) (explaining that patent rents may be dissipated in more or less efficient ways).
96
See, e.g., Hass McCook, Under the Microscope: Economic and Environmental Costs of Bitcoin
Mining, COIN DESK, June 21, 2014 at 11:02 BST, http://www.coindesk.com/microscope-economicenvironmental-costs-bitcoin-mining/.
97
See, e.g., Colin Percival, Stronger Key Derivation via Sequential Memory-Hard Functions,
http://www.tarsnap.com/scrypt/scrypt.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2014). This proposal is the basis for
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whose solution would contribute to a social need, such as storage of archival
information.98
This strategy shares with Bitcoin’s the principle that what is rewarded is
“proof of work,”99 differing only in the type of work to be rewarded. The argument
that proof of work of some type is essential is that it provides a defense against
Sybil attacks.100 Suppose that Bitcoin drastically reduced the number of new
Bitcoins issued with each block and eliminated transaction fees. Altruism alone
would likely be sufficient for some people to set up servers to verify transactions
of nontrivial size.101 But malicious users might then take advantage of this by setting
up servers to create block chains in ways that benefit them. For example, they might
remove some number of previous blocks from the block chain and then generate
many new blocks, creating a new longest chain that the non-malicious Bitcoin
servers would recognize as well. This could allow the malicious users to recover
Bitcoins they have previously spent.
This type of manipulation is much more difficult with Bitcoin’s demanding
proof-of-work standard, because a manipulator would need to be able to create
blocks faster than everyone else combined. A manipulator could do this with
ownership of more than 50% of the computing power dedicated to solving the
hashing problem. This would allow the manipulator to execute what is known as a
51% attack,102 producing more blocks than everyone else combined. For example,
the manipulator could remove a block (containing a transaction in which it spent
money) and continue hashing until it had produced at least one more block than

LiteCoin. See LITECOIN, https://litecoin.org (last visited Nov. 20, 2014).
98
See Andrew Miller et al., Permacoin: Repurposing Bitcoin Work for Data Preservation, available
at http://cs.umd.edu/~amiller/permacoin.pdf (offering an alternative “scratch-off puzzle” for
cryptocurrencies that is memory hard and would serve the socially beneficial function of preserving
data).
99
Proof of work was originally developed as an anti-spam mechanism. See Cynthia Dwork & Moni
Naor, Pricing via Processing, Or, Combatting Junk Mail, Advances in Cryptology". 19
CRYPTO’92: LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE 139 (1993).
100
A Sybil attack is an attack on a peer-to-peer system in which the attacker presents many different
identities. See John R. Doceur, The Sybil Attack, 2429 LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE 251
(2002) (discussing how such attacks can be prevented).
101
Many people, after all, voluntarily devote computer resources to peer-to-peer projects. See
YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 81-89 (2006).
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See, e.g., Daniel Cawrey, Are 51% Attacks a Real Threat to Bitcoin? (June 20, 2014, 11:42 BST),
http://www.coindesk.com/51-attacks-real-threat-bitcoin/ (discussing the possibility of 51% attacks).
Someone with less than 50% of the computing power has some chance of generating two blocks
before everyone else generates one block, but the chance is not as high, and it is even less likely to
be able to generate three blocks before everyone else generates two.
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everyone else combined. It could then add all of these blocks at once to the block
chain, including a spend of the money to a different account on one of the blocks,
and legitimate Bitcoin miners would accept the new block chain as the legitimate
block chain. Such a manipulator also might be able to selectively keep new
transactions off the block chain, continuing to lengthen the block chain but only
with transactions that it selects. But a 51% attack would be extraordinarily
expensive (recently estimated at over $1 billion),103 and so it would not be worth
the luxury of a double-spend transaction. Perhaps the greater risk is that a
government might do this with the goal of destroying Bitcoin rather than enriching
itself, but even this seems far-fetched.104
Proof of work thus provides robust protection of the block chain. Arguably,
however, it is not necessary or at least not necessary to the same degree, and a
number of alternative cryptocurrencies either greatly reduce reliance on proof of
work or eliminate it altogether. For example, Nxt uses a system that it calls
“transparent forging,” in which users take turn “forging” (instead of “mining”) 105
new blocks. The order is based on a hash function and is thus quasi-random,106 but
each user’s opportunity to hash is proportional to that user’s ownership, so Nxt’s
system is based on the principle of “proof of stake.”107 The protocol will ignore a
block that is mined when it is not one’s turn. Peercoin, meanwhile, does not
explicitly use the concept of turns. 108 Any coin owner may attempt to mine a block,
but using coins to do so uses up those coins’ “coin age.” If there are competing
block chains, the chain with the greatest “coin age” is the authoritative one.109 In
both systems, creating a block requires minimal computing power, and block
creators will have incentive to include transactions with minimal transaction fees.
103

See Bitcoin, COINOMETRICS, http://www.coinometrics.com/bitcoin/brix (last visited Sept. 12,
2014).
104
See Kroll et al., supra note 56, at 13-14 (modeling the possibility of a “Goldfinger” attack by the
government).
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http://nxtcoin.wikia.com/wiki/FAQ (last visited Sept. 12, 2014).
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Introduction: What is Nxt?, NXT WIKI, http://wiki.nxtcrypto.org/wiki/Nxt_Wiki (last visited
Sept. 12, 2014).
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See The Nxt Wikia, WIKIA, http://nxtcoin.wikia.com/wiki/FAQ (last visited Sept. 12, 2014)
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2014).
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Proof-of-stake systems present their own manipulation challenges,110 but to mount
a 51% attack, one would need to own more than 50% of the total currency value.
Someone in that position would have no incentive to double-spend, since any
benefit from double-spending would be offset by a decrease in value to the currency
as a whole.
Though there remains the possibility that any cryptocurrency is vulnerable
to attacks not yet conceived, the continuing viability of proof-of-stake systems
suggests that proof of work is not essential to a cryptocurrency. Bitcoin mining
harms Bitcoin holders by diluting their share in Bitcoin. Issuance of new Bitcoins
is a form of seignorage revenue for the Bitcoin institution but that revenue is
currently spent entirely on mining. The proof-of-stake currencies show that the
seignorage revenue could have a neutral effect on currency owners, but it is also
possible that a peer-to-peer cryptocurrency could use its decentralized fiscal power
for other purposes. If a cryptocurrency had some means of engaging in nonmechanical decisionmaking about what interests to support, it could assign new
coins to individuals who advance those purposes. Moreover, a robust
decisionmaking mechanism could allow other peer-to-peer institutions to
piggyback on a cryptocurrency, accepting cryptocurrency from private parties and
then spending it.
The case against complete reliance on proof of work is a normative
argument based on economic efficiency, but existing proof-of-stake systems
confront a normative argument based on conceptions of economic equality. The
objection is that in a pure proof-of-stake system, all coins are allocated to the initial
creators of the system. As one online commentator objects, “This scheme is
completely unacceptable because it’s not ‘compatible’ to decentralized nature of
cryptocurrencies.”111 A counterargument is that the entrepreneurs and programmers
who create and promote a currency are providing value.112 Arguably, this is better
than a system like Bitcoin, which still gives great value to its founders (since they
can mine coins when the hashing is easy) and then subsidizes wasteful activity. But
some may not find this argument to be persuasive. Perhaps a system that allocates
110

See Iddo Bentov, Ariel Gabizon & Alex Mizrahi, Cryptocurrencies Without Proof of Work,
TECHNION, July 18, 2014, at 4, available at http://www.cs.technion.ac.il/~idddo/CoA.pdf. One
problem they identify is that if multiple parties simultaneously create a block, it becomes rational
for the next forger to sign both blocks to reduce the danger that the forger will pick the wrong one.
Id. at 2-3. More troublesome is the possibility that a forger might seek to bribe the party that would
forge next or perhaps several such parties to enable a double-spend transaction. Id. at 3. Bentov et
al., however, offer a number of solutions to these problems. Id. at 2-9.
111
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cryptocurrency to be distributed over time to those who contribute to the project
would satisfy both efficiency and equity concerns.
A full assessment of these normative arguments is beyond my scope here,
but the superficial appeal of these arguments has relevance. The Bitcoin protocol is
able to perform the function of a decentralized fisc only because people believe that
Bitcoin is valuable—which is because they believe that other people will believe
that Bitcoin is valuable. This is the highest level tacit coordination game that
already exists in Bitcoin, and it can be broken down into separate types of tacit
coordination. For Bitcoin to maintain value, people must continue (1) to believe
that cryptocurrencies are valuable, (2) to believe that Bitcoin in particular has value;
and (3) to agree on just what the Bitcoin protocol is. The case for (1) is presented
above,113 but normative arguments may also be relevant to (2). The relative appeal
of cryptocurrencies depends on tacit coordination, which may depend in part on
saliency, on financial features, and also on normative appeal. Meanwhile, anyone
can produce a “hard fork” of Bitcoin, changing the protocol but accepting the
existing block chain,114 and normative arguments would then be relevant to the
question of which resulting block chain should be viewed as authoritative.
Perhaps the greatest existential threat to Bitcoin is the possibility that there
will be a tipping point that leads to some other cryptocurrency dominating it. This
could also destabilize cryptocurrency markets more generally, for relative value
instability makes the broader project unstable. This presents challenging design
questions for Bitcoin developers. Arguably, they should seek to incorporate
features of leading alternative currencies, much as the leader in a yachting race
should tilt its sails in the same direction as the follower, to prevent even a chance
of losing the lead.115 But one could also argue that Bitcoin should be conservative,
reinforcing the perception of its stability and reducing the risk associated with
experimentation. The current structure of Bitcoin decisionmaking promotes
conservative decisionmaking. The centralized developers incorporate suggested
113

See supra text accompanying notes 29-37.
David Kirk, Cryptocurrency: What is a Fork?, TECH-RECIPES, http://www.techrecipes.com/rx/48517/cryptocurrency-what-is-a-fork/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2014). A hard fork in
the rules concerning a valid block occurs only when the new rules would result in acceptance of
blocks that the old rules would reject. See Consensus Rule Changes,
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changes only given consensus116 in part because of concerns that lack of consensus
would lead not only to a new competitor currency but more problematically to a
fork of the Bitcoin block chain itself.117
This may be the correct course. Peer-to-peer decisionmaking could,
however, be useful as a bulwark against a hard fork. The most plausible scenario in
which a hard fork could occur is if Bitcoin miners collude to change the rules of
Bitcoin, presumably to give themselves more Bitcoin, for example by increasing
transaction fees118 or changing the schedule at which new Bitcoins will be
created.119 Miners already join together in mining pools, and commentators have
noted the possibility that this collusion could facilitate agreements to change the
Bitcoin protocol.120 This seems especially plausible because the rate at which new
Bitcoins are issued is planned to reduce exponentially, and there is no current plan
for mandating minimum transaction fees.121 The miners have large fixed
investments in computers custom-built for mining,122 and especially if individual

116

The Bitcoin wiki states that when a Bitcoin improvement proposal “is contentious and cannot be
agreed upon . . . the conservative option will always be preferred.” Bitcoin Improvement Proposals,
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2014).
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enterprises faced bankruptcy as a result of decreased revenue,123 they might have
an incentive to accept the risks associated with a hard fork. In principle, Bitcoin
could survive with a hard fork, and Bitcoins that existed on one block chain but not
the other would have a value based on the relative perceived legitimacy of the block
chains. But this would add complexity, as Bitcoin payment processors would need
to offer different prices for block chain A, block chain B, and block chain A & B
Bitcoins, and further forks would complicate things further.
A peer-to-peer decisionmaking mechanism could reduce the risk of a
successful hard fork in two ways. First, if such a mechanism were established and
were used to make normative decisions about the evolution of Bitcoin, the resulting
decisions might have greater perceived legitimacy. Miners colluding to execute a
hard fork of Bitcoin would recognize that the success of their project would depend
on the outcome of the tacit coordination game in which people assess the relative
authoritativeness of the two forks, and this might depend on normative
considerations. One argument they might make currently is that a centralized group
of Bitcoin developers rather than the broader Bitcoin community makes decisions
about changes to the software and that this is less legitimate than decisions made
by the mining community. A peer-to-peer decisionmaking mechanism could help
neutralize that argument. Second, peer-to-peer decisionmaking could allow more
rapid evolution of Bitcoin. To avoid the perception that Bitcoin is an oligarchy, the
centralized developers make changes only when they perceive strong consensus in
favor of the changes. But high supermajority requirements can block useful
improvements,124 including decisions necessary either to appease miners or to
protect against their assumption of greater power.
II. PEER-TO-PEER GOVERNANCE FOR CRYPTOCURRENCIES

Bitcoin, Part I showed, offers an ingenious scheme for maintaining a
consistent ledger without using a central server. The protocol uses a simple
coordination rule to decide which of multiple block chains required the most work
to create and therefore is authoritative. It incentivizes third parties to perform the
artificial tasks that make up this work by promising them new Bitcoins and
123
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transaction fees. Because simple examination of the block chain makes it possible
to determine how much work was performed to create it, this coordination
arrangement makes falsification of the block chain virtually impossible. Other
cryptocurrencies rely on other simple coordination rules to determine the true block
chain. None of the cryptocurrencies requires any human judgment. Mechanical
rules reduce the chance that disagreement about which block chain is correct could
lead to a hard fork of the currency, with some users owning Bitcoins valid on one
block chain but not the other.
The need for human judgment, however, cannot be avoided when the
questions at issue become more complex. Part III will address issues that would
arise in using peer-to-peer governance beyond cryptocurrencies, for tasks such as
determining whether to authorize a payment to be made from an insurance fund.
The purpose of this Part is to argue that even for an institution with goals as simple
as those of a cryptocurrency—essentially, maintaining a reliable ledger of
transactions—incorporating human judgment may strengthen the institution rather
than harm it. The success of Bitcoin unavoidably depends on tacit coordination
around which version of the protocol should count as authoritative. Creating a
formal coordination game with Bitcoin payments could focus the results of the
informal tacit coordination game, thus stabilizing Bitcoin and reducing the
possibility that Bitcoin will be administered for the benefit of particular groups
(such as miners) rather than for the benefit of users as a whole.
Part II.A will begin the task of illustrating how a cryptocurrency could make
decisions peer-to-peer with a simple decision currently conducted centrally:
approval of a proposed checkpoint. This can be analogized to an administrative
adjudication resolving a yes-or-no issue. Individual binary decisions can be
aggregated into more complex decisions, including how to improve a text or code,
and Part II.B will thus explore how Bitcoin could make peer-to-peer decisions about
how to evolve the Bitcoin protocol itself. Because the protocol is expressed as code,
this is a general decisionmaking task analogous to rulemaking.125 Then, Part II.C
will show how a cryptocurrency could be designed to award new coins to those
who promote the currency, thus requiring decisions about how much money should
be given to various parties. This demonstrates how to create a discretionary
decentralized fisc. In combination, these capabilities cover the essential building
blocks of any decisionmaking system.
A. Checkpointing
Checkpointing is a useful starting point because it constitutes a centralized
element to the peer-to-peer system. Moreover, it can be thought of as a simple
125
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binary decision—someone proposes the addition of a checkpoint, and a decision
must be made whether it should be created—and a binary decision such as a vote
is a fundamental building block in any system of decisionmaking. A checkpoint is
a hash of a block that is in the block chain.126 Software honoring a checkpoint will
reject a proposed block chain that does not contain the checkpoint hash, without
need even to calculate the total effort in producing the presented block chain.127
Once a Bitcoin mining client accepts a checkpoint, it will reject even a hypothetical
longer block chain, thus reducing the damage that could be accomplished with a
hypothetical 51% attack.128 Currently, checkpoints are included sometimes when
the Bitcoin reference code is updated for other reasons.129 This means that Bitcoin
includes few checkpoints,130 but some other cryptocurrencies include a much larger
number of centralized checkpoints.131
Before describing how a tacit coordination game can produce checkpoints,
it may be useful to consider other decentralized options. This highlights that peerto-peer governance producing normative decisions is possible even if one cannot
rely on a system of tacit coordination or if one prefers not to do so. The main
purpose of this Article is to defend the proposition that peer-to-peer governance is
possible. The subsidiary purpose is to argue that peer-to-peer governance should be
based on tacit coordination games because of the weaknesses in other approaches.
Thus, in Part II.A.1, we will consider peer-to-peer governance through voting, vote
buying, and jury-like mechanisms. Part II.A.2 will an explicit tacit coordination
game can decide on checkpoints. The purpose of both sections is to highlight how
peer-to-peer governance may be used in general. Checkpointing is selected as an
example not for its importance, but for its simplicity.
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1. Resolution Without Tacit Coordination
The most obvious mechanism for accomplishing peer-to-peer governance
is voting. For example, if someone proposes a new checkpoint, we could allow
anyone to vote on the new checkpoint and count up all the votes. But the general
principle of one-person, one-vote132 will not work with peer-to-peer governance
based on Bitcoin. In theory, a peer-to-peer governance system might maintain a list
of people (or just people authorized to vote) and provide some mechanism for them
to authenticate themselves.133 But Bitcoin does not do that, and it is not possible to
know whether hundreds of different Bitcoin addresses correspond in fact to the
same person. Thus, in the absence of reliance on some external non-peer-to-peer
people-tracking mechanism, Bitcoin cannot allow voting based on one-person, onevote, even if that were desirable.
As a result, the most obvious mechanism for implementing voting is to
allow voting proportionate with ownership interests. This is, of course, the general
system for voting in corporate law.134 At least one cryptocurrency, NXT, allows for
voting on certain types of issues based on ownership interest.135 Presumably, voters
will share an interest in a cryptocurrency’s success, and voting by interest may work
for other types of peer-to-peer institutions as well. But voting in proportion to
interest has two problems, both familiar from corporate law. First is the problem of
oppression, that those with a majority of interests may make decisions to benefit
themselves at the minority’s expense.136 Second is the problem of apathy. Many
132
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voters may not take time to fully study the issues, leading to uninformed voting, 137
and many voters may choose not to vote, leading to voting that is not broadly
representative of the population. These are of course also familiar problems in both
republican government138 and direct democracy.139
These problems may not be large in the context of checkpointing, because
relatively little is at stake, but there are dangers. Suppose, for example, that a
sufficiently large coalition of miners seeks to exclude other miners. For example,
established miners might try to block new entrants into the mining market. They
might accomplish this with checkpoints, validating versions of the block chain with
only their own recent blocks and thus implicitly rejecting the blocks of new
entrants. Of course, such a coalition might simply change the rules of Bitcoin and
add their own checkpoints, but it may be easier to exploit collusion by adding
checkpoints within the protocol rules. If the rules allowed for peer-to-peer
decisionmaking about checkpointing, then even new entrants following these rules
would be forced to accept the superiority of the establishment block chain. The
establishment miners do not own all Bitcoins, but they are a large interest group
who would vote. It may be irrational for most other Bitcoin owners to take the time
to learn about checkpointing issues and vote their own shares, and so the selfinterested miners—even if they were just a small minority of Bitcoin owners—
might be able to make decisions to benefit their own interests.
A vote buying mechanism faces even greater problems along these lines.140
A vote buying scheme is effectively an auction, and the outcome that receives the
most financial support is chosen as policy. Bitcoin owners could send Bitcoins to
one address to register support for a checkpoint and a different address to register
opposition. These would be public keys created without corresponding private
keys, so sending the Bitcoins would destroy them. Holders of small stakes will have
little incentive to try to buy their preferred outcomes. This would be true even if
137
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there were a policy providing for refund of the Bitcoins spent by the losing side or
the winning side; as long as there is any probability one will lose one’s Bitcoins,
the optimal individual strategy is to free-ride. Moreover, small holders of Bitcoins
would have little incentive to become informed in the first place.
Vote buying has long been viewed as undemocratic,141 but recent research
has suggested that a variation on vote buying could work in the corporate context.
E. Glen Weyl describes quadratic vote buying, in which the cost of votes purchased
is a quadratic function of the number of votes.142 For example, someone buying two
votes would pay four times as much as someone buying one vote. The cost of a
marginal vote is thus linear in the amount of votes purchased,143 thus
counterbalancing the increasing marginal benefit of votes. Weyl and Eric Posner
argue that this could be especially useful for corporate law, addressing the concern
that existing shareholder voting relies on shareholders who may not have sufficient
information to vote.144 An approximation they call square-root voting would simply
allow shareholders to vote the square root of the number of shares they own.145
Weyl recognizes, however, the danger of “de-merging,” in which a single
individual pretends to be multiple individuals.146 While he argues that quadratic
voting reduces the danger of this, he also shows that the relative inefficiency caused
by de-merging will be on the order of the number of separate identities created by
a de-merge.147 With Bitcoin, it would be trivially cheap for a Bitcoin owner to
separate its interests into any arbitrary number of interests, perhaps using a
“mixing” service to make it impossible to prove a common origin.148 This defeats
quadratic voting. The scheme could be used with Bitcoin only if voting were
restricted to verified identified individual owners of Bitcoins. Perhaps a peer-to-
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peer system for such verification could be developed, but at least for now, it does
not seem a viable mechanism for achieving peer-to-peer governance.
The jury system ensures that some decisions are made by individuals who
are forced to scrutinize the evidence with some care. Could we adapt the
mechanism to Bitcoin, designating a random sample of Bitcoin owners to make
decisions, such as whether to approve a checkpoint? Certainly, it would be possible
to select random Bitcoin owners, with the probability of being selected proportional
to their interests. One might even imagine a system for punishing selected users
who refused to cast a vote.149 But forcing them to engage in reasoned
decisionmaking is likely to be much more difficult. We could require evidence of
reasoned decisionmaking, such as a written opinion.150 But there are two problems
with this. First, some Bitcoin owners might offer to create such evidence for others,
but that again would shift power to those with greater stakes in decisions. Perhaps
we could police such activity, but that would require normative judgment. Second,
assessing whether someone has engaged in reasoned decisionmaking requires
normative judgment too. Thus, the problem is recursive. Insisting on reasoned
decisionmaking requires more reasoned decisionmaking.
All this does not mean that it would be impossible to build peer-to-peer
governance on a voting mechanism or on a random selection jury-like mechanism.
The problems that we have identified exist in our own familiar democratic and
corporate institutions, yet they endure. The adaptations are complex. In
corporations, for example, voters elect board members and entrust those board
members to make decisions,151 and of course voting for representation is the critical
feature of republican government. Perhaps similar adaptations could be imagined
for Bitcoin, with identifiable Bitcoin owners electing representatives who have the
limited role of supervising voting by anonymous Bitcoin owners. There may,
however, be an alternative, a decisionmaking process that is peer-to-peer to the
core. All peer-to-peer mechanisms, including Bitcoin, file-sharing,152 and other
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projects,153 are built to achieve cooperation even in the face of hostile adversaries
who would destroy the system or manipulate it to their own benefit. Group
decisionmaking can be seen as just another such problem, and the peer-to-peer
challenge is to create a coordination rule that produces clear and generally
justifiable decisions in such conditions.
2. Resolution with Tacit Coordination
How would a peer-to-peer checkpointing system work? The goal of this
Article is not to describe the full range of peer-to-peer normative decisionmaking
systems or even to identify the best, but rather to illustrate proof of concept. As a
result, we will begin with a simple peer-to-peer mechanism for constructing a tacit
coordination game to make a binary decision.
Someone could support a new checkpoint by paying a proposal fee to a preestablished address not under any individual’s control and including in the
transaction metadata a reference to the hash representing the block that would serve
as the checkpoint being proposed. Once the proposal transaction were added to the
block chain, all could recognize the normative decisionmaking process’s initiation.
Individuals would then have a fixed period of time within which to dedicate
Bitcoins to supporting or opposing the checkpoint. One would demonstrate support
or opposition by transferring Bitcoins to designated addresses, such as public keys
generated from hashes of the proposal transaction followed by strings such as “Yes”
and “No”. The chance that anyone would own these addresses is infinitesimally
low, because the system for generating keys prevents anyone from purposefully
generating a private key corresponding to any particular public key.
The purpose of all these transactions is simply to create a convention for
announcing support or opposition to a particular proposal, and the proposal fee
would count as an initial announcement of support for the proposal. The fixed
period could be measured in number of blocks to be added to the block chain from
the time of the initial proposal, but if there is a sufficient amount of activity at the
end, the time period would be automatically extended.154 The winning position
would be the position with the most support, and the money dedicated by the losers
would be allocated to those supporting the winning position. Earlier supporters
would receive money before later ones, so there would be no incentive to add
communities).
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See Moshe Babaioff et al., Incentives in Peer-to-Peer Systems, in ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY
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money to the winning side at the last minute. This reallocation would be
accomplished by the generation of new Bitcoins for the winners.
For example, suppose that a proposal is made to add a checkpoint based on
block X. The proposal is initiated by A, who is required to pay a proposal fee of at
least (let us suppose) 1 Bitcoin and meets that minimum obligation. Suppose that B
places 2 Bitcoins against the proposal and then C places 1 Bitcoin against the
proposal. (We will count B’s transaction as occurring first if it is listed earlier in the
block chain.) If there are no other transactions, then the proposal fails, 3 to 1. This
would entitle B to a generation transaction of 3 Bitcoins altogether (including the 2
Bitcoins to be refunded) and C to a generation transaction of 1 Bitcoin. Because all
the original Bitcoins that were voted are effectively destroyed, the total number of
spendable Bitcoins in existence remains constant. Of course, if D had buttressed
A’s position by spending another 10 Bitcoins, and no other transactions occurred,
then the checkpoint would be approved. A would receive 2 Bitcoins (equal to its
investment plus 1 of B’s Bitcoins) and D would receive 12 Bitcoins (its investment
plus 1 of B’s and 1 of C’s). It does not matter whether D and A are in reality accounts
owned by the same person. If another party E also supported A’s position, then E
would simply have the funds invested refunded, without receiving anyone else’s
Bitcoins.
This game is a tacit coordination game in which potential participants must
anticipate whether more funds will be distributed in favor of one position than in
favor of another. After A devotes its 1 Bitcoin in favor of the checkpoint, B must
consider whether to match A’s Bitcoin. If B matches, B will want to at least
marginally exceed the amount offered by A so that B will win if there are no further
transactions. B will have an incentive to match and at least marginally exceed A if
B believes that no one else will participate or that if there is participation, more
participants eventually will place money against the proposal than in its favor.
Of course, A will have an incentive to fight back to win its initial bet against
B. One side or another might exceed the other’s contribution by a sizable amount
as a way of signaling its fortitude. Taking a large position, however, has two effects.
On one hand, it does show the resoluteness of the party putting that amount of
money in support of a position, perhaps implying that the party is willing to put
even more money down in favor of the same position. But it also increases the
chance that third parties will be drawn into the game. There is at least some fixed
cost associated with initial entry into the game, including consideration of the issue
to be resolved, but a contribution that exceeds the prior one functions as an offer to
enter into a bet, and it will be worth taking the time to consider this if the offer is
large. The ultimate question that a party supporting a position must ask is what third
parties would decide to do if they ultimately focused on it.
The game is thus a tacit coordination game, in which any participant must
anticipate what hypothetical other participants might choose to do in the future,
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recognizing that those hypothetical other participants would be looking
prospectively at still other hypothetical participants. The dynamics of this particular
tacit coordination game are similar to those of an all-pay auction,155 in which
existing investments are not sunk, and so participants have incentives to bolster
these investments. But rational participants in such an auction will recognize that
others will have the same incentives and risk aversion will counsel against throwing
good money after bad.
Everyone’s incentive is to do what people in the future will do, with no
authoritative answer disciplining the participants. And so the incentive is to look
for focal points that serve as tacit coordination devices, and the ultimate question—
whether a particular checkpoint should be added to the block chain—serves as a
natural focal principle. Collusion is difficult, because even if existing participants
collude, someone could try to combat the collusion and create interest that would
draw more third parties, drawn from the essentially unlimited pool of Bitcoin
owners, into the game. The initial participants are likely to have relatively high
knowledge because of the need to anticipate others’ decisions, but later participants
might be initially low knowledge and conduct research to gain knowledge, drawn
by the high stakes.
Of course, it is possible that there could be alternative focal points, but there
will be so many of them that they will tend to cancel out.156 For example, one could
argue that the original proposal is focal, or the first position that someone takes is
focal, or the most recent position that someone takes is focal, but it is hard to see
why any of these differentiates itself from any other. Similarly, one could look to
see who is making the most noise in favor of a particular position, but if that could
change a focal point, then everyone would scream.
This argument is admittedly somewhat informal, and it may seem
inconsistent with game theory. As Hykel Hosni points out in an analysis of
coordination games,157 coordination games generally involve multiple Nash
equilibria.158 If one expected others to follow a particular focal point, one should
follow that as well, so the Nash equilibrium concept does not predict a particular
focal point. However, when there are multiple Nash equilibria, coordination will
often be around the solution that produces the highest payoffs to the players.159 The
155
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question of whether to use normative focal points in general is a tacit coordination
problem that will apply across many checkpoint disputes, and those who participate
in these disputes will likely be better off if the system works than if it fails. Hosni,
moreover, argues that in coordination games “agents should apply Reasons to
discard those possible strategies that will prevent them from conforming on their
mutual expectations,”160 for example because multiple strategies that point in
different directions are indistinguishable, and “a perfect reason will be a choice
function which always returns a singleton, a unique strategy.”161 The normative
argument for using normative focal points is, in this framework, a reason that
returns a single strategy, using normative focal points.
What does it mean, though, for the normative question—in this case,
whether a checkpoint should be added—to serve as a focal point? Perhaps a more
precise statement of the principle would be that the focal point is the best answer to
the question. The Bitcoin software code itself includes a comment indicating that
“a good checkpoint block”162 should be “surrounded by blocks with reasonable
timestamps”163 and “[c]ontains no strange transactions.”164 The existing checkpoints
seem to have round block numbers,165 perhaps to emphasize that the checkpoint is
arbitrary rather than designed to achieve some advantage. A checkpoint should be
sufficiently recent that it is useful, but sufficiently old that the probability of its
being dropped from the block chain would be extremely small, so that the
checkpoint functions solely to speed up and solidify block chain analysis rather
than to change the outcome. One could, of course, debate the relative importance
of all of these considerations or perhaps even whether some of these considerations
couple who must make independent decisions without communication prefer attending a Bach
concert to a Stravinsky concert, but the Stravinsky concert is also a Nash equilibrium because if one
attends that concert, the other would prefer attending together than attending separately); see also
Anna Gunnthorsdottir & Palmar Thorsteinsson, Tacit Coordination and Equilibrium Selection in a
Merit-Based
Grouping
Mechanism:
A
Cross-Cultural
Validation
Study
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1883465 (July 11, 2011) (demonstrating tacit coordination on the highest
payoff option in a laboratory experiment).
160
Id. at 49.
161
Id.
162
Bitcoin/Checkpoints,
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https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/src/checkpoints.cpp (last visited Sept. 24, 2014).
163
Id. Sometimes, a Bitcoin block will have a timestamp before a block that is nominally earlier in
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matter at all. Participants in the peer-to-peer checkpoint process may well engage
in some form of online debate. But someone considering all of these factors will
likely come to some conclusion about how strong the case is for a new checkpoint.
Different people may come to different conclusions, and they may change their
views once other people credibly signal their own views. But it is this familiar
process of trying to figure out the best answer to a problem that seems likely to
constitute the search for the focal point.
Does this focal point decisionmaking mechanism share the flaws of other
peer-to-peer mechanisms? Superficially, it might appear to be quite similar to the
vote buying mechanism. That approach and the focal point approach both
ultimately resolve a question based on which of two positions attracts a larger
number of Bitcoins. But the incentives are critically different, because with the
focal point mechanism, those who supported the winning side receive the
contributions in support of the losing side. We must still address, however, whether
apathy might lead to poor decisionmaking and whether the process is likely to be
biased in favor of concentrated interests. The financial incentive to be on the
winning side is central to addressing both questions. This addresses the concern
about apathy. The mechanism requires only a few individuals to participate, and it
gives those individuals incentives to inform themselves sufficiently to enable
predictions of what the final resolution might be. The larger the amount at stake,
the greater the incentives to acquire information and generate arguments will be.
The danger that some Bitcoin owners’ interests might be given a high
degree of weight, however, is more serious. An initial concern might be that anyone
with self-interest would be able to bias the process, even if that owner has only a
small number of Bitcoins relative to the broader community of potential
decisionmaking participants. There is some danger of this, because it will be
rational for participants to change their assessment of the focal point given signals
from others. An investment in a particular position might reflect a genuine view of
the focal point or an attempt at manipulation, but the former possibility will receive
at least some weight. The more common attempts at manipulation are, however, the
less weight they are likely to receive in focal point analysis. Moreover, such
attempts will generally encourage others to participate in the process, because
making an investment inconsistent with the focal point provides a financial
opportunity for those on the opposite side.
Overall, the effect is similar to that of “noise traders” in the stock market,
who make their decisions for reasons other than market fundamentals. These noise
traders can influence prices, but they also attract more participation from
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sophisticated parties.166 This can make stock prices more precise overall,167 though
less precise in cases in which there is more self-interested participation than
expected. Whether self-interested participation on net improves accuracy or
decreases it is an empirical question, though empirical evidence from analogous
contexts is encouraging.168 Even isolated effects of self-interested advocacy in
individual cases may be troubling, but self-interest affects many types of
decisionmaking with which we are familiar, including lobbying in the legislative
arena and hiring local counsel who knows the judge in the judicial one. The
mechanism described here at least gives third parties incentives to try to identify
manipulation and challenge it.
A concern of potentially greater magnitude is that the existence of selfinterest may change the focal point. This seems unlikely when the self-interest is
contained to individuals with a relatively small number of Bitcoins, but the problem
is more severe if the self-interest affects a large proportion of the Bitcoin
community and especially of the community that participates in adjudicative
decisionmaking. If participants in the tacit coordination game expect that there is a
high probability that the later participants will be Bitcoin miners, for example, they
might try to identify the normative focal point from the perspective of the Bitcoin
miners. This provides a strong argument for including individuals other than
Bitcoin miners in the normative decisionmaking process.169
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It seems unlikely, however, that the interests of Bitcoin miners will receive
disproportionate weight in any normative analysis. Each participant will have more
at stake from the money being placed at risk than from collateral consequences, so
even if someone would like to collude with other Bitcoin miners, a participant will
have an incentive to defect if the ultimate focal point is expected to be some
distance from what the miners would prefer. The focal point is not likely to depend
much on who participates in the tacit coordination game, because there is a strong
normative argument for considering the welfare of the entire Bitcoin community.
Even if it did depend on the identity of the participants, there will be at least some
participants who are not Bitcoin miners, and indeed there is little reason to think
that those who mine will be especially likely to participate in decisionmaking. And
even if most active participants are miners (and this seems unlikely), in the pool of
potential participants, the proportion of Bitcoin miners seeking to obtain some
collateral advantage will be small. In short, it seems doubtful that the interests of
large concentrated groups like miners will receive greater weight than the interests
of the broader public. Perhaps they might receive slightly more weight. But large
concentrated groups receive much more weight in democratic processes,170 so at
least this seems likely to be an improvement.
We cannot predict the result of tacit coordination games based on theory
alone. There are multiple equilibria in any tacit coordination game, so game theory
alone cannot determine which equilibrium will result.171 We have seen, though, that
Bitcoin’s success already is dependent on multiple forms of tacit coordination, and
this is true for other institutions. The “ultimate rule of recognition”172 that results in
the acceptance of legitimacy of governments can be viewed as the outcome of a
tacit coordination game. If that game produced a general perception tomorrow that
Bozo the Cloud is dictator, then the Era of Bozo would begin. We do not worry
about that in the United States because the tacit understanding making the
government legitimate is strongly entrenched. History teaches that tacit
coordination can produce great stability, but does not always do so.
Peer-to-peer governance could be introduced gradually, allowing for
testing. The decisionmaking apparatus initially might serve as a tool for
recommending decisions to the Bitcoin software repository administrators.
170
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Initially, they might ignore it altogether, choosing their own checkpoints instead.
But if it produced reasonable recommendations, they might establish a weak
presumption in favor of following the checkpoint recommendations of the peer-topeer decisionmaking system, and perhaps later a strong presumption and then the
exclusive mechanism by which they decide whether to add checkpoints.
Eventually, the client software might be modified so that it automatically
incorporated a checkpoint whenever the analysis of the block chain revealed a
completed decisionmaking process recommending one. If this proved problematic,
the administrators could remove this feature from the client software. But gradually
increased reliance on peer-to-peer decisionmaking will build legitimacy over
time.173
B. Evolution of the Reference Code
Checkpoints are a relatively trivial aspect of Bitcoin operations. Currently,
a checkpoint is added only as part of a regular client software update. Some
competing cryptocurrencies checkpoint much more often, but this may be because
they think this is a necessary security precaution in the absence of a proof-of-work
system.174 So, decentralizing checkpointing would make only an incremental
difference in the degree to which Bitcoin decisionmaking is peer-to-peer. A more
fundamental innovation would be to use peer-to-peer decisionmaking to resolve
whether to change the client software in the official repository. Fully implemented,
this innovation would allow decisions recorded on the block chain to determine
whether changes should be made to the source code. In principle, this could be used
for any open-source project, and it could be used to generate or amend documents
of any kind, including public or private rules and regulations.
Open-source projects are generally managed with the assistance of
versioning software (the current most popular versioning protocol is git175), which
amounts to a more powerful version of the “track changes” feature in popular word
processors. This software allows users to make a version of the software code,
change it, and then propose that it be integrated into the official version. For
173
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example, a recent proposed change to Bitcoin involved adding a feature enabling
the host of the software to limit the total bandwidth it uses.176 The user who
proposed this had created a remote fork of the master branch of the project, copying
all of the code files to a repository under that user’s control. After making changes,
the user later filed a “pull request”177 for the remote fork to be merged into the
master branch, which would involve changes to 14 different files. Ordinarily, a user
filing a pull request will have incorporated changes made in the master branch since
the original creation of the remote fork.178 The centralized software developer or
developers can choose whether to accept a pull request. Periodically, the centralized
developer will create a new branch within the repository designating a new version
of the open source software by forking from the master branch. This new branch
may thus include several sets of new features and other changes, such as
documentation improvements and bug fixes. Anyone can then compile the
software, and some websites (such as the Bitcoin Foundation’s website,179 in the
case of Bitcoin) host the compiled versions, including installers for multiple
operating systems.
The critical determinations necessary to control the development of a
software repository are whether to accept a proposal to pull changes from a remote
fork into the master fork and whether to create a new version branch of the software
based on the current master branch. Peer-to-peer decisionmaking ideally also would
control whether to create experimental branches and whether to approve pulling
changes into these branches. This would enable peer-to-peer decisionmaking about
the development of features, rather than only about whether some final proposed
version of a feature should be accepted in the master branch. For any particular
decision, the process could work exactly like the normative decisionmaking process
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for determining whether to accept a proposed checkpoint described above.180 A user
would pay a proposal fee by making a Bitcoin (or other cryptocurrency) payment,
using metadata to indicate in some concise way the nature of the proposal.181
Owners of Bitcoins (or other cryptocurrency) could then send money in support of
or in opposition to a proposal, and eventually the losing side’s contribution would
be distributed to the winning side.
Those who have control over a repository could observe when decisions
were final and update the repository accordingly. Of course, they might choose to
disregard changes, but anyone else could create a version of the repository
including the relevant changes. Peer-to-peer decision proposals could specify the
hash of the repository that would exist if those proposals were implemented, and
those downloading repository code could confirm a hash match. So, if a norm of
peer-to-peer decisionmaking were clearly established, there might be many
repositories that were mirrors of one another, and operators of client software
simply would reject the repositories that were not up-to-date. A peer-to-peer
decisionmaking process removes the need for any one software repository to be
designated or even thought of as the official one. We have seen that the Bitcoin
protocol establishes a mechanism for determining which of competing block chains
should be accepted as the correct one, and the peer-to-peer decisionmaking protocol
would ensure that the authoritative block chain can determine which of competing
software repositories should be considered to be authoritative.
With these decisionmaking elements in place, the peer-to-peer
decisionmaking process would resemble legislative processes for proposing
legislation, offering amendments, and amending amendments. In contrast to the
process followed in Robert’s Rules of Order,182 however, more than one set of
issues can be debated at any particular time.183 Of course, the normative evaluation
of whether to approve a proposal to merge a set of changes into a master branch
involves in part an assessment of whether this is the appropriate time to do so. It
180
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might not make sense to accept Change X yet because it makes sense for Change Y
to be considered, either because Change Y is more important, or because Change Y
was developed earlier and might affect the desirability of Change X. Often, it will
make sense to achieve group consensus on a general principle for proceeding before
full development of that principle into code. And so a proposal to allow a particular
change might fail at one time but succeed later.
Similarly, the normative case for creating a new version of a repository
might be weak at one time but stronger a few weeks later, when more time had
passed from the previous version and more testing has taken place. Peer-to-peer
decisionmaking may be more chaotic than a structured meeting with a recognized
chair, but it should be able to resolve issues in a reasonable order. A peer-to-peer
decisionmaking mechanism also might support group decisions on whether to
change the time at which a particular decision is to be resolved. This would reduce
the risk associated with supporting or opposing a proposal, because decisionmakers
on the primary question could focus on the overall merits of the question, while
others could focus on questions of timing.
Software tools could be developed that would automatically update
repositories based on determinations in the block chain. But this is not essential.
What is essential is the general acceptance of the principle that the block chain,
pursuant to the decisionmaking mechanism described above or some other peer-topeer mechanism, determines the software. This completes a circle: The Bitcoin
protocol determines the block chain, and the block chain determines the Bitcoin
protocol. The existence of this circle would enable evolution both with respect to
the rules determining the authoritative block chain (for example, if decisionmakers
incorporated a proof-of-stake component into Bitcoin) and the rules governing the
determination of what counts as an authoritative decision (for example, the
mechanics of the formal tacit coordination game).
The possibility of changing the decisionmaking process may decrease the
chance of total rejection of the decisionmaking system. But such rejection will
always be possible. Anyone can always make a normative argument that other
participants in an open-source software project should use some version of the
software other than the officially sanctioned one, or that one set of agreed-upon
rules should be disregarded in favor of another set, regardless of their respective
pedigrees. Establishing a peer-to-peer system for making decisions, however, can
provide perceived legitimacy to the corresponding software repositories, at least if
peer-to-peer decisionmaking came to be accepted over time. It would seem strange
for someone to advocate immediate change to some alternative software repository
not recognized by the official process, simultaneously repudiating both the
decisionmaking rules and the decisions made pursuant to those rules. Constitutional
law analogously often successfully channels demand for change into either calls for
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changes consistent with the constitution or for changes to the constitution, typically
pursuant to the provisions set forth by the constitution itself.184
Decisions might be made to entrench some rules of decision or some aspects
of the Bitcoin protocol by establishing a higher threshold of decision, 185 thus
creating a form of higher-order law analogous to constitutional law. This provides
a possible response to a plausible objection to using peer-to-peer decisionmaking
for Bitcoin in particular. One feature of Bitcoin trumped by some advocates is that
there is no central bank deciding on monetary policy, because the schedule of
Bitcoins to be produced was fixed at the outset.186 People will be more comfortable
holding Bitcoin, the argument goes, knowing that this serves as a check against
inflation. The argument is similar to that offered by those, most notably Milton
Friedman,187 who argue that monetary policy should be conducted according to
rules set forth in advance. There are familiar rebuttals that can be adapted to Bitcoin,
that the ability to determine the course of growth of the currency would make it
possible to adapt to unexpected needs.188 If, however, flexibility in decisionmaking
would produce too much inflation, the Bitcoin mining schedule could be made
unchangeable or difficult to change change.
Creation of higher-order principles is not a foolproof safeguard against
change, because there could be a decision to change a higher-order decision.189
184

In the United States, legal change is manifested in statutes or in constitutional amendments under
Article V of the Constitution. It remains possible, however, that the people could reject the
Constitution, and Akhil Amar has argued that the Constitution specifically recognizes the right of
the people to do so. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment
Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994).
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For example, a proposal might require that two-thirds of money placed down be in favor of
changes, if those changes affected certain documents or code sections in the repository. This would
decrease the potential gains from supporting such a change. One could also imagine a provision
simply requiring some high standard, such as “very high confidence,” for certain types of changes.
The peer-to-peer decisionmakers would then decide whether the particular proposal met that high
standard.
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See, e.g., How Does Bitcoin Work?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 11, 2013, 10:50 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/04/economist-explains-how-doesbitcoin-work; supra note 84.
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See Milton Friedman, Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice, 14 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING
98, 100-01 (1982) (discussing the rules that should be adopted to manage monetary policy).
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See, e.g., Scott Sumner, In Defense of a Flexible Monetary Policy, CATO UNBOUND (Nov. 8,
2013), http://www.cato-unbound.org/2013/11/08/scott-sumner/defense-flexible-monetary-policy.
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An analogy in American constitutional law might be a change to the representation of states in
the Senate. The Constitution guards against this change even by constitutional amendment. See U.S.
CONST. art. V (“[N]o state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the
Senate.”). Some observers, however, have argued that it would be possible first to amend the
Constitution to remove the obstacle to this type of amendment to the Constitution, and then to amend
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Arguably, however, such a higher-order decision could provide better protection
against inflation than the existing decisionmaking system. After all, there is nothing
to stop the software developers of the official Bitcoin repository from changing the
schedule at which Bitcoins can be released, other than the possibility that others
will reject the authoritativeness of their repository. The most plausible clash of
competing interests foreseeable for Bitcoin is the possibility that miners will
demand greater rents, whether in the form of additional Bitcoin mining allowances
or in the form of transaction fees. This would provide some benefit to the public,
by increasing the cost to mounting a 51% attack.190 But miners’ interest will be in
higher rents than the public would favor. The miners could claim to be the authentic
representatives of the Bitcoin community and reject the official software repository.
Faced with a credible threat of a hard fork, those who control the central repository
seem likely to give into the miners’ position, at least partly. Current developers may
insist that they act solely on the basis of consensus, but the drastic future reduction
in the issuance of new Bitcoins means that transaction fees will have to increase at
least somewhat, and given differing interests, consensus as to how great the
increase is seems unlikely. The most probable outcome will be quite close to the
interests of the miners.
Creation of a peer-to-peer decisionmaking system could help avoid this
outcome. If formal tacit coordination games became the accepted mechanism for
determining change to the Bitcoin protocol, there would remain the possibility of
tacitly coordinating around some other result. For example, peer-to-peer
decisionmaking could decide against minimum transaction fees, but if most miners
acted as if blocks with transactions below some hypothetical minimum were
invalid, the Bitcoin protocol effectively would insist on transaction fees. But such
coordination might be more difficult than it would be absent a formal mechanism
for making decisions about the protocol. Miners seeking to coordinate amongst
themselves to create minimum transaction fees would be not merely advocating
that policy but also advocating rejection of the entire peer-to-peer decisionmaking
system and replacement with some other system. This makes the change more
radical and thus more difficult to tacitly coordinate upon.
The greatest challenge for peer-to-peer decisionmaking may be the
difficulty of initiating it, even with gradual introduction. Miners, of course, would
be able to see that such a system might lead in the long term to the reduction of
their power. They might therefore resist peer-to-peer decisionmaking, likely
focusing on legitimate concerns such as that it has not sufficiently been tested. As
long as the Bitcoin software developers proceed truly by consensus, it is unlikely
the Constitution either to change the representation of states in the Senate or to allow subsequent
legislation to do so. See, e.g., Robert W. Bennett, Democracy as Meaningful Conversation, 14
CONST. COMMENTARY 481, 486 n.14 (1997).
190
See supra note 102 and accompanying text.

PEER-TO-PEER GOVERNANCE

46

to be adopted. But if the developers did gradually institute such a system, the miners
today might not yet have sufficient incentive to risk a hard fork of the currency.
After all, any long-term adverse consequences for the miners might be years away,
and the rents for miners so far in the future will likely be dissipated by hardware
investments in the interim. Today, there is probably sufficient tacit coordination
around a particular software repository that a decision by developers to move
gradually to a system that eliminates the need for such a repository would not create
so much resistance as to destabilize the currency. Perhaps the greater obstacle, then,
might be among the software developers themselves, who might prefer to control
the main repository than to have peer-to-peer decisionmaking.
C. Rewarding Institution-Promoting Activities
The two examples detailed above illustrate that peer-to-peer
decisionmaking can be used both for binary decisions and for decisions about
whether to accept and change a particular text or code. Another type of decision is
a quantity decision. Legal systems frequently make quantity decisions, for example
when juries decide how much damages to award a plaintiff in a case in which the
defendant has been found liable. Bitcoin or some other peer-to-peer institution,
meanwhile, might wish to implement a more robust decentralized fisc. Bitcoin’s
mining mechanism, we have seen, provides rewards only for a particular type of
activity providing benefits to the Bitcoin community, mining.191 Most institutions,
however, choose to spend money on a variety of purposes, so a mechanism for
committing to spend money or rewarding activities undertaken on behalf of an
institution could be central to some peer-to-peer decisionmaking institutions.
Bitcoin itself might benefit if rewards were available for other activities
benefiting Bitcoin. For example, one might argue that Bitcoin should reward those
who make significant contributions to the code base. Some claim that there are not
enough volunteers interested in working on low-level aspects of the code.192
Monetary payment might be counterproductive by making individuals less likely
to make altruistic contributions,193 but for some types of contributions with less
inherent interest, monetary payment might be useful. Or, perhaps it makes sense to
reward commitments to help stabilize the currency by buying at least a certain
amount of the currency should its value on exchanges fall below a certain level. Or,
perhaps businesses that enable Bitcoin payment or developers of services
191

See supra Part I.C.
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complementary to Bitcoin should receive some grant subsidy as a means of further
extending Bitcoin. Bitcoin could establish policies allowing or prohibiting
payments for different classes of contributions, and then where permitted, use
quantity decisions to determine the size of contributions.
The existing approaches to decisionmaking could easily be used to make
quantity decisions. Numbers can be represented in binary form, so a group of binary
decisions could be used to make a quantity decision. One binary decision could
represent a single unit; another, two units; another, four units; and so forth, with
decisions on the largest conceivable numbers of units being resolved first. The text
decisionmaking approach could work as well. A text, after all, could consist simply
of a number, and user proposals to change the number would be assessed with the
same decisionmaking approach described above for changes to the reference
code.194 A number likely would become more refined over time, as preliminary
decisions on an approximate level would not be revisited in fixing on a final value.
It would also be possible to design peer-to-peer decisionmaking processes
geared specifically to decisionmaking about quantities. For example, given a need
to reach agreement on a quantity such as a reward, one participant could propose a
particular number by sending a proposal fee to an address in a transaction indicating
in metadata the purpose of the payment. The metadata would also contain the
participant’s proposal of a certain number. Another participant might then propose
a different number by paying the same amount or a higher amount to the same
address, with metadata specifying the new number proposal, and subsequent
participants could do the same. Each new proposal amounts to a bet with the prior
proposing participant that the new participant’s proposal will be closer to the final
number than the prior participant’s. The size of this bet is the amount of the prior
participant’s bet, after deducting the amount that the prior participant had bet with
the participant before that. The tacit coordination game is thus much like the earlier
ones, with each participant considering what participants will decide in the future.
The decision can be deemed final once a sufficient period elapses either with no
proposals or with volatility in the most recent proposal below some predetermined
threshold.195
For example, suppose A proposes 15 with 1 Bitcoin, B proposes 30 with 2
Bitcoin, C proposes 20 with 3 Bitcoin, and D proposes 40 with 3 Bitcoin. If D’s
transaction is the last one, then B would have won its 1 Bitcoin bet with A, C would
have lost its 1 Bitcoin bet with B (i.e., the 2 Bitcoin that B invested minus the 1
Bitcoin of that which corresponded to B’s investment with A), and D would have
won its 2 Bitcoin bet with C (i.e., 3 Bitcoin – 1 Bitcoin that C bet B). The remaining
194

See supra Part II.B.
Volatility might be measured, for example, as the standard deviation of the most recent proposal
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investment, D’s extra 1 Bitcoin, would be refunded, as would winning bets. There
is, of course, some risk of simultaneous transactions (suppose B1 and B2
simultaneously challenge A), but the protocol could resolve which block should be
considered authoritative in this case. For example, if a block contained multiple
challenges to a particular transaction, then the block with the greatest challenge
amount could control, and the other transaction would be void; 196 if the amounts
were equal, then the block that appears earliest in the block chain would be
authoritative.
It might seem that there is a flaw in this scheme, and indeed the flaw may
exist to some extent in the earlier proposals as well. The flaw is that there may be
no incentive for the first participant, A in the above example, to pay the proposal
fee. Once A pays the proposal fee, a subsequent participant will challenge whenever
it expects to be able to improve on the estimate more than some hypothetical
subsequent participant could improve on its own estimate. But A will have no
incentive, unless A has some intrinsic interest in the question at hand. If resolution
of the quantity decision is important for peer-to-peer governance, then, it may make
sense for the peer-to-peer institution to cover some portion of the proposal fee as a
means of subsidizing the decisionmaking. Similarly, it may make sense to cover
some portion of any increase in the amount at stake. It’s not inherently obvious,
however, how large any such reward should be. So, one could use peer-to-peer
decisionmaking to determine the size of the reward on some other question being
resolved by peer-to-peer decisionmaking.
The recursion inherent in this can be resolved by providing for some default
reward proportion to be paid unless someone pays a proposal fee to initiate
decisionmaking on some other reward proportion. For example, we might imagine
a default reward proportion of 0. Suppose that A initiates a decisionmaking, urging
that a reward be paid to some Bitcoin owner on account of that Bitcoin owner’s
work promoting Bitcoin. A thus pays a proposal fee of, say, a mandated 1 Bitcoin.
The Bitcoin owner might be A itself, or might not be. Either during or after the
process of determining the reward to be paid, someone might propose some reward
to A to offset some or all of the expense of the proposal fee. The proposer of this
reward might be A as well, or might be someone else willing to pay the proposal
fee, with a lower mandate of, say, 0.1 Bitcoin, since the stakes will be lower. In
principle, someone could initiate yet another decisionmaking process to offset a
portion of the 0.1 Bitcoin proposal fee by paying a proposal fee at some preestablished minimum level, though at some point, the level of recursion will be
such that participants are likely to reject the proposal.
196
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III. THE POSSIBILITIES AND PERILS OF PEER-TO-PEER GOVERNANCE

A cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin, Part I showed, can perform the central
tasks of traditional institutions—maintaining a ledger, spending money, and
making decisions—peer-to-peer, though in a constrained way. Incorporating formal
tacit coordination games into a cryptocurrency, we saw in Part II, can allow for a
more flexible decisionmaking apparatus. Nonetheless, if peer-to-peer
decisionmaking were limited to cryptocurrencies, it would hold relatively little
interest for legal theorists, other than perhaps those specialized in specific types of
financial institutions or transactions. This Article has focused on cryptocurrencies,
however, only because they are a central building block for any peer-to-peer
institution. Naturally, we should not expect or want peer-to-peer decisionmaking to
take over our central democratic institutions. But it is possible that peer-to-peer
decisionmaking could assume niche responsibilities, most obviously in private law
contexts, but perhaps in public law as well.
A. Peer-to-Peer Arbitration
Perhaps the most obvious application of peer-to-peer decisionmaking would
be as a form of arbitration. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, parties can
voluntarily by contract use private arbitrators to resolve their disputes, and the
federal courts will honor those private resolutions.197 The courts have interpreted
the Act broadly, including for example by allowing arbitration provisions in
contracts of adhesion to preclude class-action litigation.198 At least one
commentator considering the possibility of online arbitration has argued that online
arbitration would be permissible.199 The vision for such arbitration, however, is not
of a peer-to-peer institution, but simply of arbitrators, chosen either by the parties
or by the arbitration agency, using technology such as chat rooms or
videoconference to lower some of the transaction costs associated with arbitration.
Peer-to-peer arbitration could represent a far greater departure from existing
litigation and arbitration. First, peer-to-peer arbitration by definition would not
require the selection of particular arbitrators. Second, such arbitration could avoid
the need for legal enforcement of judgments (and the danger that the courts might
refuse to honor peer-to-peer arbitration decisions, for example on the theory that
they violate due process rights)200 if the arbitration is used simply to resolve disputes
197
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over funds placed in escrow. If possession is nine-tenths the law,201 then courts are
unlikely to interfere with the outcome of a self-executing peer-to-peer arbitration.
Third, peer-to-peer arbitration would not require formalized rules governing the
presentation or consideration of evidence or arguments. Once a party initiates the
decisionmaking process, participants would consider whatever evidence they
considered relevant. The litigants would have some incentives to release
information that benefited their respective cases and potentially even information
that hurt their cases if that information is actually less harmful than decisionmakers
would think in the event release were refused.202
It might seem that an absence of procedural rules would be a serious
disadvantage of peer-to-peer arbitration. Some rules may be unnecessary or less
necessary with peer-to-peer decisionmaking. Rules of jurisdiction203 and associated
doctrines, such as venue204 and forum non conveniens,205 determine the court in
which a lawsuit should be filed. In a peer-to-peer arbitration, there is no need to
select a particular arbitrator or arbitration forum for peer-to-peer decisionmaking,
because anyone may participtae. Other rules, such as provisions allowing for
hearings, help ensure that judges cannot shirk from the task of hearing and
evidence. Peer-to-peer arbitration, by contrast, provides financial incentives for
careful consideration.206 Still other rules, especially those that allow appeal, help
questions about whether peer-to-peer decisionmaking offends due process is likely to be pragmatic.
Matthews v. Eldridge, 96 U.S. 893, 907-909 (1976), recognizes that due process is highly contextspecific and considers factors including the risk of error and the costs and burdens of procedures.
The resolution of a due process inquiry would thus likely depend in part on an empirical assessment,
either rigorous or anecdotal, of the peer-to-peer decisionmaking.
201
See Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths of the Law: Title, Possession & Sacred Obligations, 38
CONN. L.REV. 605, 605 (2005).
202
Economists have recognized that incentives to release information can be powerful when
inferences will be drawn from refusal to release the information. See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts,
Relying on the Information of Interested Parties, 17 RAND J. ECON. 18, 30-31 (1986) (“[R]ational
skepticism by a decisionmaker can lead to a full-information decision by inducing one party to
reveal information that is damaging to its interests. The party reveals this information for fear that
withholding it will lead to an even more unfavorable supposition by the skeptical decisionmaker.”).
203
See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (introducing the modern
framework for personal jurisdiction); U.S. CONST. art. III (limiting federal courts’ subject matter
jurisdiction).
204
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2012) (setting forth the federal venue rules).
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See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (developing federal version of
doctrine).
206
Hearings and trials may also serve a psychological function, helping satisfy litigants’ desire that
someone consider their perspective. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988). It is an empirical question how peer-to-peer
decisionmaking would compare in imparting a sense of procedural justice. One might assume that
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prevent idiosyncratic decisionmaking by a single individual and ensure that the law
is followed. Peer-to-peer decisionmaking involves multiple decisionmakers, thus
reducing the risk of idiosyncratic judgment, though perhaps exacerbating the risk
that decisionmakers might consider factors not strictly relevant from a legal
standpoint.207
The ultimate question is the empirical and subjective one of whether peerto-peer arbitration, whether procedure-free or with a well-developed set of
procedural rules (perhaps created by peer-to-peer decisionmaking itself, resolving
issues such as time limits for a defendant to answer a plaintiff’s complaint208),
would be superior to a more traditional system of adjudication or arbitration. It is
impossible to take a firm position on this. The experiment seems a worthwhile one,
if the worth of an experiment is measured by the degree of uncertainty as to its
outcome. Perhaps peer-to-peer arbitration would be cheaper than traditional
arbitration, both because of saved transport costs and because of the expense
associated with formal proceedings, but this is not guaranteed. Maybe peer-to-peer
arbitration will lead to more predictable decisions, because no single person will
control the outcome. It is also possible, though, that freedom from legal constraints
will add randomness and arbitrariness.
The care that peer-to-peer decisionmaking participants take in their
evaluation of evidence would depend partly on the protocol rules. The larger the
peer-to-peer proposal fee,209 the greater the incentive that peer-to-peer
decisionmakers will have to educate themselves. Who should pay the fee and how
large it should be is a question alien to public adjudication, where taxpayers
subsidize the courts,210 but familiar in the arbitration context, because arbitrators
must be paid.211 One might use peer-to-peer decisionmaking to set the size of the
peer-to-peer decisionmaking would be inferior because of a lack of in-person contact, but trial is so
rare in civil adjudication that the benefits of in-person contact cannot be a primary benefit of the
system. See generally Mark Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004) (discussing the
increasing rarity of trials).
207
Even if peer-to-peer decisionmakers believed that some evidence should be disregarded, they
might nonetheless have trouble ignoring it. See Andrew J. Wistrich, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible
Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005) (showing
that judges similarly have difficulty ignoring inadmissible evidence).
208
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209
See supra Part II.A.2.
210
See Stephen J. Ware, Is Adjudication a Public Good? “Overcrowded Courts” and the Private
Sector Alternative of Arbitration, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 899 (2013) (arguing that some
parties should have to pay market rates for adjudication provision).
211
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729, 736-43 (2006) (discussing arbitration fees).
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fee, to be paid by the plaintiff. The size should depend on the marginal benefit of
increased adjudication accuracy. Our litigation system contains only relatively
crude mechanisms for adjusting the amount spent to judge cases based on the
amount at stake, such as the existence of separate courts for small claims.212 Judges
are likely to use their discretion to spend more time on more important matters, 213
but no financial incentives drive this result. With peer-to-peer arbitration, one’s
incentives to invest in researching a case will be proportional to the probability that
one will conclude that prior participants have not fully taken factors into
consideration and to the proposal fee.
Peer-to-peer decisionmaking also could be used to affect litigants’
investment incentives. For example, peer-to-peer decisionmaking similarly might
be applied on a case-by-case basis to determine whether one side must reimburse
the other for their legal fees or other expenses, based on factors such as whether the
case was close.214 Perhaps to avoid idiosyncratic decisionmaking on such issues,
legal systems generally do not allow case-specific inquiries about fee shifting.215
Moreover, our litigation system generally makes no attempt to limit parties’
spending on developing reasonable legal arguments.216 Because each party will not
take into account the effect of its spending on the welfare of its opponent, the result
is likely to be excessive spending, relative to the amount that the parties ideally
would spend ex post to make the contract efficient ex ante. Arbitrators or judges
could be empowered to levy fines for excessive legal investment, but we would be
hesitant to place such discretion in individuals, especially if there is a danger that
they might use this power to shirk on their own work.

212

See generally Austin Sarat, Alternatives in Dispute Processing: Litigation in a Small Claims
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216
Mechanisms do exist for penalizing frivolous arguments. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11. But these
are used sparingly. See Neal H. Klausner, The Dynamics of Rule 11: Preventing Frivolous Litigation
by Demanding Professional Responsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 300, 311 (1986) (“It is a rare
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Whether this would increase predictability of decisions and whether it
would better control spending on arbitrations are empirical questions. The point
here is simply that peer-to-peer arbitration is not just arbitration moved onto the
Internet, but a different form of decisionmaking with strengths different from those
of conventional arbitration and litigation.
B. A Peer-to-Peer Trust
If peer-to-peer arbitration can serve as a means of producing relatively
predictable decisions relatively cheaply, then it could in turn serve as the foundation
for a peer-to-peer trust.217 A settlor would establish the trust by a transaction that
would send Bitcoin to an address from which it could not be spent by ordinary
means.218 Metadata for the transaction would indicate the purpose of the trust and
circumstances in which the trust could be disbursed.219 At any later point, someone
could pay at least a minimum proposal fee, which could be established by the trust,
to initiate a request for funding for the trust. Requests for discretionary funds might
require higher proposal fees than requests for nondiscretionary payments. This
would initiate a peer-to-peer arbitration to resolve whether a payout should occur
and, if so, the size of the payout that should be granted. The peer-to-peer arbitration
could also consider whether any part of the proposal fee or other payments made
during the arbitration process by participants should be refunded from the trust.
New currency could then be issued in the amount specified and awarded to the
public address of the party applying for a payment.
The Bitcoin protocol would need to recognize that when an adjudication
concluded with a decision to make a payout, the payout should result in the creation
of new currency in the specified amount. In theory, one could bake into the protocol
itself a rule that total payouts from a trust cannot exceed the amount paid into the
trust, but it is also possible for the protocol simply to allow peer-to-peer decisions
to create new currency. This would thus delegate to the peer-to-peer
decisionmakers the task of ensuring that excessive payments are not made. If peerto-peer decisionmaking can be used to pay out arbitrary rewards for those who help
217
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promote a currency,220 then it should also be possible to use such decisionmaking
to pay out arbitrary amounts for other purposes. If the general mechanism of formal
tacit coordination games works for subjective decisionmaking, it should work as
well for questions with objective answers (such as whether a trust has sufficient
funds remaining to support a request), particularly because participants could
program computer-based agents to participate in decisionmaking to support
objective rules. This should be profitable if one anticipates that the focal point
solution will be to enforce such rules. In principle, peer-to-peer decisionmaking
also could be used to undo mistakes of peer-to-peer decisionmaking, but objective
errors seem highly unlikely in any event.
The potential efficiency benefit from a peer-to-peer trust is that it might
lower transaction costs. In 1984, John Langbein argued that the high transactions
costs associated with the probate system had led to an increased reliance on
techniques for transferring assets without resort to probate.221 For example, life
insurance proceeds and pension accounts name specific beneficiaries, who can
receive the relevant funds without direct legal intervention.222 Probate continues to
perform a critical function in clearing title for real property, but there are means
sometimes to evade even this, and personal property is often distributed without
judicial intervention.223 Meanwhile, secured lending allows creditors to resolve
most loans without probate.224 The reason that all of these mechanisms are preferred
to probate is that “[t]he probate system,” Langbein explained, “has earned a
lamentable reputation for expense, delay, clumsiness, makework, and worse.”225
Conventional nonprobate transfers, however, are also not without
transactions costs. Daniel Kelly notes that the combination of a will and a revocable
trust will generally involve greater ex ante transactions costs than creation of a will
alone.226 “Moreover,” he argues, “a settlor who creates a trust may have to perform
additional tasks like transferring assets into the trust or changing beneficiary
designations.”227 Transactions costs are likely to be especially large when the
grantor wishes to impose subjective conditions on distribution of trust funds. For
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example, a common trust provision allows for funds to be used only for purposes
such as education or health.228 A trustee will then be needed to determine whether
particular claims for payment should be honored. In the case of bad faith or serious
abuse, the courts can remove a trustee.229 Even short of that, refusals to make
payouts can lead to lawsuits.230 A lawsuit may demand correction of an
overpayment,231 and so trustees historically have been conservative in authorizing
payments.232 A trust can grant a trustee “absolute” or “uncontrolled” discretion, but
the Restatement (Third) of Trusts provides that “[t]hese words are not interpreted
literally.”233 “It is a matter of interpretation,” the Restatement explains, “to
determine the degree to which a settlor’s use of language of extended discretion
(e.g., ‘absolute discretion’) manifests an intention to modify the normal duties of
the trustee and the normal grounds of judicial intervention in the exercise of a
discretionary power.”234 A settlor thus cannot definitively avoid judicial
interference and its attendant costs.
There are thus at least two possible benefits to a peer-to-peer trust that could
lead settlors to prefer such a mechanism to either probate or a conventional
nonprobate trust. First, creation costs could be quite low, since few or no formalities
would be required. The only requirement would be making a cryptocurrency
payment with sufficient metadata so that the purpose of the payment could be
ascertained. Second, the peer-to-peer trust would rely on peer-to-peer
decisionmaking, which might be cheaper than a conventional trustee. A
conventional trustee will have to charge enough money to cover the risks associated
with being a trustee, including the possibility that the trustee will be found to have
acted in bad faith and required to replenish the trust.235 The peer-to-peer trust could
allow a settlor to prevent judicial interference with the trust’s decisionmaking. A
settlor might wish to do this if the settlor is sufficiently confident in the peer-to228
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peer decisionmaking process. This is not for everyone. Judicial trust supervision
provides benefits. But just as nonprobate transfers have allowed an end run around
perceived inefficiencies of probate law, so too could cryptocurrency trusts allow an
end run around perceived inefficiencies of conventional trusts. A cryptocurrency
trust thus serves a niche for those who believe that they face high transactions costs
with conventional trusts.
C. A Peer-to-Peer Bank
The peer-to-peer trust, as described so far, lacks one common feature: the
ability to invest trust funds. The trust money is set aside until the money is needed,
so the investment is ultimately in the cryptocurrency itself, rather than in a
diversified form. Ideally, it would be beneficial for the trustee to be able to invest
deposited Bitcoins pending trust withdrawals to grow the trust corpus. This is, of
course, possible with conventional trust relationships. The trustee simply relies on
a financial institution such as a bank or mutual fund, depositing the trust moneys
and then withdrawing them as needed. Peer-to-peer decisionmaking could support
mechanisms for deciding when cryptocurrency should be exchanged for other
assets controlled by a bank. The challenge for a cryptocurrency is how to execute
that exchange. The problem is that there is no mechanism allowing cryptocurrency
accounts to own virtual assets. For a peer-to-peer institution to own assets besides
virtual currency, some interface is needed between the virtual and real worlds.
A cryptocurrency bank can establish this connection. The bank would serve
the role of a trusted intermediary. Potential depositors would need to decide
whether to trust any bank, based on its track record and any assurances it might
provide with regard to its security practices and its financial practices. Early
experiments with Bitcoin banks have not inspired confidence, with at least two
major bank failures from apparent failures to safeguard Bitcoins.236 But it seems
plausible that a bank might establish a reputation over time. Even a wholly
anonymous bank might inspire trust so long as the present discounted value of
expected bank profits is greater than the benefit to the bank of stealing deposits. It
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is more plausible, though, that trust could be achieved through transparency, with
identification of the bank owners, so that they might face criminal liability should
they steal money and at least reputational sanctions should they fail to safeguard it.
A cryptocurrency bank operating in this way is not a peer-to-peer bank. A
virtual currency operated by a trusted intermediary is not a peer-to-peer institution;
indeed, the purpose of Bitcoin was to offer a peer-to-peer alternative to the trusted
intermediary approach. A bank that serves as a trusted intermediary will maintain
its own centralized records and management. Deposits into and withdrawals from
the bank might be conducted entirely by Bitcoin and thus appear on the block chain,
but if the bank itself is chartered in some jurisdiction, then it is not peer-to-peer.
Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to consider the role that cryptocurrency banks might
have in supporting peer-to-peer institutions, along with the danger that such banks
might support criminal activity, before considering the possibility of a true peer-topeer bank.
A cryptocurrency bank, in principle, could hold accounts in the name of
cryptocurrency public keys. For example, a peer-to-peer decision might be to place
a trust corpus into a particular cryptocurrency bank. The bank would have released
a public key corresponding to an account it controls, and the peer-to-peer
decisionmaking process could result in new currency then being assigned to this
public key to offset the funds placed into trust. The owner of the private key (the
bank) could do with this currency what it wished, including swapping the
cryptocurrency for ordinary currency via an exchange.237 It thus would be able to
place funds into traditional investments. Peer-to-peer decisionmaking could result
in a withdrawal decision, and the bank would then be expected to send
cryptocurrency back to the trust. Presumably, a failure to do so would mean that
peer-to-peer decisionmakers would not use that bank in the future.
Just as peer-to-peer arbitration or a peer-to-peer trust could offer lower
transaction fees than traditional equivalents, so too might a cryptocurrency bank
reduce transaction fees. But the principal reason that this is so is that a
cryptocurrency bank might more easily escape regulation. If it becomes easy for
individuals or organizations to move their funds to cryptocurrency, and they can
anonymously move cryptocurrency to bank accounts, they may be able to opt out
of bank regulation. One motivation for this is that bank regulation is expensive.
Theorists justify the expense on the grounds that it benefits depositors238 and
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contributes to macroeconomic stability,239 though some individual depositors might
prefer banks with less regulation. Another motivation for cryptocurrency banking
would be to facilitate crimes such as tax evasion and money laundering.240
An anonymous cryptocurrency bank likely could not easily be regulated,
assuming the cryptocurrency has sufficient privacy protections, because there
would be no way of identifying the owners of the bank. But an anonymous bank
will have a harder time drawing in cryptocurrency customers. Banks that seek to
bolster their credibility by being public can be regulated in the countries in which
they are located. It only takes one country to create an offshore banking haven.
Such a jurisdiction would likely want to regulate such banks somewhat, to assure
depositors, but might offer minimal regulation and maximal privacy protection.
Cryptocurrency makes it more difficult to pressure a jurisdiction into cooperating
with international transparency laws designed to deter money laundering. Existing
financial regulation can target offshore banking by the indirect means of regulating
transfers between offshore banks and ordinary banks.241 One could, however,
transfer cryptocurrency directly to a cryptocurrency bank in such a haven.
Countries such as the United States could attack cryptocurrency banks in
one of two ways. First, they might put pressure on the haven jurisdiction. Second,
they might seek to regulate transactions in which individuals purchase
cryptocurrencies, demanding disclosure of their identities, and then seek to regulate
those individuals. Authorities might, for example, regulate cryptocurrency ATMs,
which in principle can make it easy to exchange cash and cryptocurrency
anonymously. But it may be more difficult to regulate black markets.242 As long as
individuals can buy and sell cryptocurrency with fiat currency, cryptocurrency
banks will be difficult to regulate.
It may seem that our focus so far on cryptocurrency banks that are trusted
intermediaries rather than truly peer-to-peer undermines the argument that it is
possible to imagine robust peer-to-peer institutions. If one must rely on a trusted
intermediary model to create a cryptocurrency bank, then perhaps true peer-to-peer
institutions are impossible. The obstacle, however, is solely a legal one: A fully
functional bank must be able to own real assets, since a primary function of a bank
239
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is to invest funds. A peer-to-peer institution could own assets only if the legal
system recognized the peer-to-peer institution as legitimately existing and having a
form of personhood sufficient for the ownership of property. Real property
purchased by a trust, for example, might be held in the name of the public key or in
the name of the cryptocurrency as a whole.
Recognition of such ownership may seem unlikely, because of concerns that
cryptocurrency ownership might facilitate illegal activity by providing anonymity.
But a refusal to allow cryptocurrency ownership because of discomfort with
cryptocurrencies would be self-defeating. Trusted intermediaries would still exist
in other jurisdictions, and so cryptocurrencies would remain helpful for money
laundering. Meanwhile, a refusal to allow ownership would impede legitimate
cryptocurrency transactions and reduce the government’s ability to regulate peerto-peer banks or other peer-to-peer institutions. If a peer-to-peer bank or customer
fails to follow applicable regulations, then the legal system could seize assets
owned by the peer-to-peer institution. The legal system would need to develop
principles for regulating such property seizure. For example, the legal system would
need to assess when property ownership made a particular cryptocurrency account
or cryptocurrency amenable to jurisdiction, addressing such timeless questions as
whether the exercise of jurisdiction could be predicated solely on the basis of
property ownership.243 However those questions are resolved, the legal system can
regulate peer-to-peer institutions to the extent it permits them to own assets within
its jurisdiction, but can do little about offshore trusted intermediaries that promote
money laundering.
D. A Peer-to-Peer Business Association
A peer-to-peer bank is a specific realization of the more general concept of
a peer-to-peer business association. The peer-to-peer bank accepts funds, makes
investment decisions, and approves expenditures, and these are the general
functions of any business association. We can thus imagine peer-to-peer
decisionmaking being used to operate a peer-to-peer business association. The
business might raise funds by soliciting contributions in Bitcoin or another
cryptocurrency, make investment decisions, and ultimately pay dividends or
liquidation funds to the investors. The business association might sue and be sued.
A peer-to-peer business association would not be a sole proprietorship, partnership,
limited liability company, or corporation, at least as traditionally conceived. The
243
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traditional forms of business association differ in how they allocate ownership
interests and decisionmaking authority, but the peer-to-peer business association
allocates decisionmaking authority in a new way—not to a specific owner, to
partners, to a Board, or even to shareholders, but to the peer-to-peer decisionmakers
as a whole.
Whether peer-to-peer business associations fill a niche depends on whether
there are situations in which such associations minimize the sum of agency costs.244
The agents of the business association would be the peer-to-peer decisionmakers
who voluntarily participate in the tacit coordination game, for profit motive. Such
decisionmakers might have less self-interest than managers or directors of a
corporation, since the peer-to-peer decisionmakers would not receive a salary from
the entity. This would help reduce agency costs. Of course, some individual
decisionmakers might have some interest, for example in a contract that the peerto-peer business association might undertake, but to avoid losing money in the peerto-peer decisionmaking process, they would need to persuade others about the
relevant corporate decision. Meanwhile, such decisionmakers might well have
more information than shareholders, who often have little incentive to become
informed about corporate affairs.245 How much incentive they have to acquire
information—and whether they would have as much information as managers or
directors—depends on the size of proposal fees and thus the subsidy for
decisionmaking.246
A limitation of peer-to-peer business associations is that their decisions
would be inherently transparent. But there may be some industries in which
transparent decisionmaking would furnish an advantage. For example, such
decisionmaking might reassure potential contractual partners that they are not being
taken advantage of. To the extent that secrecy in business affairs is needed,
however, peer-to-peer decisionmakers could decide to hire employees, including
executive managers, and allocate decisionmaking power to these managers,
including the power to maintain information in confidence. The only decisions that
thus must remain secret are the decisions by the peer-to-peer decisionmakers
themselves. Of course, to the extent that peer-to-peer decisionmaking controls only
who managers or directors are, the benefits as well as the costs of peer-to-peer
decisionmaking would be reduced.
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If the legal system were to recognize peer-to-peer business associations, a
doctrinal question would be whether such business associations are entitled to
limited liability.247 If granted limited liability, a peer-to-peer business association
would still face seizure of property that it owned, but the owners of the business
association would not face additional liability as a result of the business
association’s actions. Given the ease with which business associations today can
obtain limited liability, there appears to be little reason to resist limited liability for
peer-to-peer business associations, other than resistance to the inherent idea of peerto-peer business associations. As a practical matter, defeating limited liability might
be quite difficult anyway, because governmental authorities would have not be able
to identify investors.
Once again, it might seem that peer-to-peer business associations are
fanciful. But it would only take one jurisdiction to recognize such business
associations for them to be able to contract business in multiple jurisdictions. Just
as Delaware seeks to attract corporations to receive franchise tax revenue from
them,248 so too could Delaware allow for the registration of peer-to-peer business
associations, in exchange for payment of specified fees. If Delaware were
uninterested in this business, another jurisdiction (such as Nevada, which recently
tried to compete with Delaware for corporate charter business249) might do so. The
jurisdiction might even call the peer-to-peer business association a “corporation.”
Under current law, states may not discriminate against businesses incorporated in
other states.250 Once registered or incorporated, such a business might be able to
operate in other states in much the same way as other businesses.
E. Peer-to-Peer Public Law
Our examples of peer-to-peer decisionmaking have focused on private law
for good reason. There are significant obstacles to private law peer-to-peer
institutions, even placing aside the need for extension of Bitcoin or other
cryptocurrency. One is the possibility that governmental hostility could prevent
peer-to-peer institutions from owning real assets or that government might directly
regulate or prohibit individuals from using vehicles such as peer-to-peer trusts.
Perhaps one or more governments can be persuaded to tolerate such peer-to-peer
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institutions. But it would be quite another large step before a government would
embrace peer-to-peer decisionmaking for public purposes. The strongest reason to
do so would be if existing governmental institutions are broken, for example
because of corruption. The most likely area in which a peer-to-peer public
institution might be created is central banking, though this too currently seems
speculative.
1. A Peer-to-Peer Central Bank
A peer-to-peer central bank is the most obvious public institution that might
be built on a cryptocurrency, because a cryptocurrency essentially performs the
function of a central bank. A country could adopt Bitcoin or some new
cryptocurrency as fiat currency. Bitcoin transactions are electronic, and so Bitcoin
is an imperfect substitute for cash.251 But mobile phones are becoming ubiquitous
even in the developing world.252 So, a country someday could decide to adopt a
cryptocurrency as its fiat currency. The most obvious impetus to doing so would be
a perception that the existing fiat currency has failed. This could occur if
counterfeiting becomes widespread,253 but based on history, the more likely
scenario is that the government has been unable to control inflation.
The macroeconomics literature has highlighted that it often will make sense
for a central bank to seek to “tie its hands” to prevent it from engineering inflation
surprises in the future.254 The insight of this literature is that inflation can be a selffulfilling prophecy, with future inflation depending not only on future central bank
actions but also no current (and future) expectations of inflation. And so, if a central
bank has gotten in the habit of helping the government meet its bills and inflate
away its debts by printing currency (or other mechanisms of expansive monetary
policy), the public will anticipate that the central bank will continue to do so. The
government may thus respond by hiring a new central banker with a reputation for
inflation intolerance, who is more conservative about inflation than the government
251
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itself.255 A more radical step is for a government to abandon its own currency and
simply use a foreign currency, such as the U.S. dollar.256 This can fix the inflation
expectation problems, but it comes at a price: Monetary policy can no longer be
used to address business cycle fluctuations.
A country that merely adopted a fork of the current Bitcoin project would
be solving its problem in a similar way. The growth rate of the new coins could be
specified in advance, creating stable inflation expectations. This could be better
than adopting a foreign currency, particularly if the country’s macroeconomic
conditions are not likely to be correlated with those of the country whose currency
otherwise would be adopted. Milton Friedman argued that a constant growth rate
rule may be superior to an activist central bank with a country’s own interests in
mind, 257 and a cryptocurrency can, like Bitcoin, insist on constant growth of the
monetary supply. But for those who believe that a responsible central bank can
exercise discretion responsibly,258 adopting a cryptocurrency with a mechanical
mining schedule would be harmful.
One economist, George Selgin, has considered the possibility that a central
bank could adopt a cryptocurrency as a fiat currency. 259 Recognizing the limitations
of a constant growth rate rule, Selgin suggests that the currency might be “based
upon a production ‘protocol’ such as might replicate the outcome of almost any
conceivable monetary rule.”260 For example, he refers to Scott Sumner’s proposal
for central banks to target nominal GDP, growing the currency just enough to keep
nominal GDP growth rates constant.261 But Selgin does not explain precisely how
this would work. The client software would need to be programmed with nominal
GDP levels as an input. But there could be dispute about just what the nominal GDP
levels are, and a government desiring to engineer inflation might prefer for the
official nominal GDP levels to be artificially low, so that more currency would be
produced. If the government controls a central repository for the client software, it
would be able to do this easily. The government could also at any point change the

255

See, e.g., Kenneth Rogoff, The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary
Target, 100 Q. J. ECON. 1169 (1985) (explaining that appointing conservative central bankers
reduces expected inflation).
256
See Alberto Alesina & Robert J. Barro, Dollarization, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 381, 381 (2011)
(discussing the adoption of the United States dollar by El Salvador).
257
See Friedman, supra note 187.
258
See, e.g., Sumner, supra note 188.
259
George Selgin, Synthetic Commodity Money 19-23 (2013), available at
ssrn.com/abstract=2000118.
260
Id. at 23.
261
Id. (citing Scott Sumner, Re-Targeting the Fed, NATIONAL AFFAIRS, Fall 2001, at 79).

PEER-TO-PEER GOVERNANCE

64

rule, abandoning nominal GDP targeting, by changing the client software.
Anticipation of this would harm inflation expectations.
A fiat cryptocurrency with a built-in peer-to-peer decisionmaking apparatus
can allow for monetary policy tailored to a particular country’s needs. The
cryptocurrency could be targeted at a variable like nominal GDP growth, with the
cryptocurrency itself used to change the reference software to incorporate nominal
GDP growth figures.262 Or, the currency production schedule could be specified
numerically, with peer-to-peer decisionmaking used to make changes and thus to
accomplish either expansionary or contractionary monetary policy. To avoid large
rents for miners, a proof-of-stake approach might be used in lieu of proof of work.263
There is always the danger that the government will abandon the currency for some
other fiat currency.264 But changing currencies is more destabilizing than interfering
with an existing currency, and if the existing currency has proven relatively
successful, the short-term economic costs from changing currencies are likely to
exceed the short-term benefits of being able to create inflation.
2. Other Public Institutions
A government might be willing to replace a public institution with a peerto-peer decisionmaking alternative only if several conditions are met. First, the
institution must be one that seems clearly to be failing in achieving its core goals.
Second, the peer-to-peer alternative must be seen as able to achieve the core goals
of the institution. Third, the lack of direct governmental control over the peer-topeer institution must be viewed as beneficial. Fourth, it must be difficult for the
government to interfere with the peer-to-peer institution, once it is established.
Central banking plausibly could meet all of these conditions in a country with a
history of failed monetary policy, particularly because the central function of a
cryptocurrency is so close to that of a central bank. It seems far less likely for other
public institutions, though perhaps it could become more plausible if peer-to-peer
decisionmaking became familiar in private law contexts and successful for central
banking.
The obstacle to public institutions using peer-to-peer governance is not
merely a practical one. Rather, it is a philosophical concern about the need for
legitimacy of governmental authority. What creates the conditions for legitimacy is
contested in the political philosophy literature. A tradition traceable to John Locke
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emphasizes the significance of consent.265 Such approaches might tolerate peer-topeer decisionmaking, so long as the governed can be seen as consenting to it in
particular contexts. Others emphasize the significance of representation,266 and it is
difficult to make a case that peer-to-peer decisionmaking supports democratic
participation or representation. A more recent theory, advanced by David Estlund,
argues that democratic authority is based on epistemic proceduralism, which
recognizes the tendency of democratic procedures to make correct decisions.267 This
might seem to have greater potential to serve as a philosophical justification for
peer-to-peer public institutions, yet Estlund seeks to justify democratic institutions
even conceding ignorance and other weaknesses of voters and the possibility that
there may be alternative approaches more likely to produce right answers.268 If peerto-peer institutions turn out to produce right answers more effectively than
alternatives, an answer to Estlund will still be necessary before peer-to-peer
institutions can be considered legitimate.269
IV. CONCLUSION

Although there is a long history of debate about the degree to which
government should be centralized,270 the legal literature has not previously
questioned the premise that every legally authoritative action must come from some
institution that is centralized. Even advocates of direct democracy imagine some
centralized system for counting votes in such elections. Peer-to-peer systems lack
a centralized server for recording information, but, as Bitcoin has shown, peer-topeer systems can still produce decisions about which there will be a high degree of
consensus. The very limited form of decisionmaking inherent in Bitcoin could serve
as a foundation for more sophisticated types of decisionmaking, allowing legal
institutions to be created without voting or the designation of a central authority.
The strongest case for application of such decisionmaking is for governance of
Bitcoin itself, because the current governance arrangement means that Bitcoin is in
important respects not peer-to-peer. Bitcoin could experiment with such
governance by allowing decisions to be used merely as advice about whether
software features should be implemented. Peer-to-peer law is likely to emerge
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slowly and in unpredictable ways, but it has the potential to create authoritative
decisions without authoritative decisionmakers. There may be decisive arguments
against particular peer-to-peer institutions, but legal theorists should at least allow
peer-to-peer institutions to join the menu of possible regulatory arrangements.

